The
commercial conflicts between the United States
and the European Union
By:
Fereydoun A. KHAVAND, Professor at the Paris V University
The United States
and the European Union represent among themselves alone, about 50% of the world
economy and 40% of international exchanges. Some 20% of the exports of the
European Union are to the United States and 19% of its imports come from there.
The Europe of the fifteen is the most important host territory in the world for
American merchandise, services and capital. The trans-Atlantic exchanges
therefore constitute the mai n engine of international trade relations.
This immense transatlantic partnership is, however, regularly shaken by
commercial tensions. Everything seems to indicate that these exercise an
increasing influence on the evolution of international relations, in particular
since the breaking down of the bipolar system and the disappearance of the
Soviet threat. In order to face the multiplication of commercial conflicts, the
United States and the European Union have put into place appropriat e mechanisms
in the context of their own economic diplomacy. Before examining these
mechanisms, it is necessary to study the characteristics of the commercial
conflicts.
The typology of commercial conflicts
The spectacular proliferation of conflict in international commercial relations
is one of the consequences of economic globalisation. Indeed, the explosion of
international exchanges can but accentuate the friction between States worrying
about protecting their interests in the context of international circulation of
material and non-material goods. The causes of the frictions are numerous and
their management is one of the major challenges of multilateral commercial
diplomacy during the XXIst century?s first decades. Most international
commercial conflicts find their origins in problems associated with market
access, in the defence of commercial issues and in practices considered
anti-competitive.
The conflicts associated with access to the market: The access of foreign
products to national markets clashes against obstacles of a tariff and of a
non-tariff order. The tariff-related obstacles, founded on the right to appeal
to customs rights, are the traditional instruments of protection of national
industries. This involves a tax on imported merchandise, during its transit at
the frontier. The considerable reduction in customs rights since 1948 has,
however, strongly reduced the weight of tariff-type obstacles in international
commercial relations. Due to this, these obstacles only occupy, as far as the
exchanges go between industrialised countries, a marginal place in the midst of
protectionist arsenal.
As for the the non-tariff obstacles (NTO), they are measures of public order,
other than customs rights, whose effect is to break the access of products of
foreign origin to a national market.
The arsenal of non-tariff protectionist measures is particularly rich and
diversified. It is sufficient with a little imagination, to find the most
appropriate means destined to restrict imports or to create other
disequilibriums in international exchanges. Certain international organisations
have identified over 20,000 NTOs.
Amongst the most represented NTOs, one can mention: unilateral quantitative
restrictions, voluntary export restrictions (VER), abusive application of
technical norms, administrative harassment, etc.
Conflicts tied to commercial defence: Commercial defence measures permit for
States (or a grouping of States), to protect themselves against disloyal
commercial practices enforced in other countries or to face exceptional
situations due to opening of frontiers.
Amongst these commercial measures of defence that trigger the largest number of
conflicts, safety clauses, anti-subsidy rights and anti-dumping rights, are
represented.
- The safety-clause device constitutes "a safety valve necessary for the
viabiliyt of multilateralism", and, it can be found in the midst of the
internat ional commercial System. This device reassures trading States, by
permitting them to take, under certain conditions, urgent protective measures
against importations which disorganise their market and bear or risk bearing
serious damage to their national production of similar products. Even so, the
safety measures trigger at the same time hostile reactions in those States that
have to suffer the consequences.
- Anti-subsidy (compensatory) rights are special rights claimed by an importing
State, with a view to neutralising the effects of subsidies granted, according
to it, for the fabrication and exportation of a product. In principle,
compensatory rights should re-establish conditions closer to normal competition.
In practice, they are sometimes used as a particularly strong protectionist
weapon. In fact, importing countries have a tendency to systematically apply
this measure against the most competitive products coming from the most dynamic
countries.
The concept of "anti-subsidy rights" is therefore directly related to
that of subsidies. What role can public powers assume in support of investments
and of production? This question is not directly a part of international
commercial relations. On the other hand, the subsidies that a State grants to
exportation - fiscal and tariff advantages, preferential export credits,
assistance for commercialisation, reduction in social taxes...
- constitute one
of the principal sources of conflict between trading nations.
- Anti-dumping rights: Dumping exists when a product fabricated in one country
is introduced on the market of another country at a lesser price than its
"normal value". The indicator of "normal value" of the
product may be, amongst other things, its price on the domestic market of the
exporting country.
In order to neutralise the effects of dumping, the importing country can take
recourse to "anti-dumping law". The amount of this right must however
not exceed the "dumping margin", that is to say the difference between
the price at exportation of the product in question, and its price on the
domestic market of the exporting country. The upsurge of conflicts related to
dumping and anti-dumping constitutes today one of the characteristics of
international commercial relations.
Conflicts related to anti-competitive practices: Monetary "dumping",
social "dumping", ecological "dumping", piracy and
counterfeiting, corruption and anti-competitive practices of businesses create
increasingly important tensions in international commercial relations.
- Monetary "dumping" consists of manipulating the monetary instrument,
in order to serve the interests of commercial objectives. This is an ancient
practice. The non-existence of an international monetary system worthy of its
name favours this practice. The philosophy of the international trading system,
from its birth, was closely related to that of Bretton Woods, according to which
only one regime of fixed parities can ensure the development of the multilateral
exchange system. The abandonment - at the outset of the 1970s - of the system of
fixed exchanges, in favour of a flexible flow of the strong currency, had a
considerable impact on the m ode of regulation of the world economy. Since the
Jamaica Accords (in 1976), the planned management of exchange rates is ensured,
before all, by the monetary authorities of the large industrial countries.
- The Plaza Agreements of 22nd September 1985, signed by the finance ministers
of the Group of Five (United States, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG), Japan, France), and the Louvre Agreements of 22nd February 1987, adopted
by the ministers of the Group of Seven (the Five, plus Italy and Canada) have
organised a veritable co-operation between central banks and Treasury managers
of the large industrial powers. Even so, this co-operation cannot replace the
Bretton Woods system.
- Social "dumping": this concept focuses on competition, judged
disloyal, of countries whose participation in international exchanges is not
accompan ied by a comparable development in social conditions.
In this perspective, competitivity of products coming from certain emerging
countries would only be founded on the very weak level of salary costs,
essentially due to non - respect of "social norms" such as: union
liberty for employers and their employees, the right to collective negotiation,
outlawing of child labour, banning of forced (hard) labour, etc.
During the latest international commercial negotiations, the Americans,
supported by certain industrial countries including France, requested the
introduction of "a social clause" into the international commercial
system. This proposition consists of adopting commercial sanctions punishing
violations of employment standards.
- Ecological "dumping": business ventures that do not integrate
environmental costs in their production activities can offer much more
competitive goods. When arriving on international markets, these goods enter
into competition with those produced by businesses that cannot ignore
environmental considerations and hence undergo the financial constraints
thereof.
Denouncing this "ecological dumping", certain interest groups
recommend the introduction of an "environmental clause" into the
international commercial system. It is again a question of applying commercial
sanctions against States whose environmental costs are not integrated into
exportation activities. According to this point of view, only those goods whose
production is conformed to certain criteria of an ecological order would be able
to see themselves attributed "ecolabels", permitting them to benefit
from advantages of the international commercial system.
- Piracy and counterfeiting: These enco mpass offences against intellectual
property law (IPL). IPL is a set of rules protecting (new) ideas and creation
procedures. They define exclusive rights relative to the diffusion and the
commercialisation of (new) techniques and products, and foresee sanctions
against their fraudulent utilisation (counterfeiting or piracy). At the same
time, offences against IPL have taken on alarming dimensions. Transactions made
on counterfeit products are estimated to make up 5% of world trade. The
counterfeiting of software costs each year several tens of billions of dollars
to the information-technology industry of the world.
- Corruption: Corruption in international transactions is an obstacle to
competition, provoking distortions in the exchanges taking place, and harming
both consumers and taxpayers.
- Anti-competitive practices of the firms: The domain of intervention of the
international commercial system does not stretch to inter-State relations. Hence
it does not cover the practices of private businesses that increasingly
criticise the liberalisation of commercial exchanges, by establishing private
obstacles to substitute for the tariff-type and non tariff obstacles of public
order. Successive waves of fusion-acquisition and the acceleration of
businesses' concentration procedure, on the universal scale, favouring the
return to anti-competitive practices escaping from national and regional
disciplinary measures.
Under these conditions, competition becomes restrained, prices are increased and
the markets are divided, on the basis of illicit association causing detriment
to the consumers. Amongst anti-competitive practices, intra-firm exchanges
occupy a coveted space. Despite their increasing importance in international
exchanges, multinational businesses escape for the most part, the rules of
international commerce.
Actually, an important part (over 30%) of the exchanges is composed of
intra-firm flows occurring between the mother company of an FTN and its
subsidiaries, or amongst the latter. Submitted to games involving under-billing
and over-billing, these "in-FTN" flows obey rules that are strongly
different to the normal principles of supply and demand.
Commercial conflicts of geopolitical origin: Several commercial conflicts extend
beyond the purely commercial sphere. The "pipeline war" in the Caspian
zone or the economic tensions related to the adoption of the American
extraterritorial laws, are of geopolitical origin.
This list (not exhaustive) of sources of international commercial conflicts does
not reflect the complete span of tensions that shake transatlantic relations. In
certain domains (Laws of intellectual property, "social dumping",
...), Europe and the United States have identical positions, in particular when
it comes to facing the "developing countries". On the other hand,
commercial defence and conflicts of geopolitical origin seriously divide these
two superpowers.
European Union
and the United States: Resources of commercial diplomacy
The commercial diplomacy of a State is one of the most important areas of its
economic diplomacy, the latter b eing "the search for economic objectives
by diplomatic means, whether or not they lean on economic instruments in order
to get there."(1)
The United States, during these last decades, have thrown away the foundations
of a real offensive commercial policy. The European Union, tu put into place
instruments capable of defending her commercial interests.
The United States; an offensive commercial diplomacy: American commercial
diplomacy is manifested with four aspects:
Multilateralism: The Americans remain very attached to the maintenance of the
international commercial System. As a major commercial power, America certainly
has an interest in constructing efficient barriers against the reinforcement of
protectionism. The United States have been the veritable instigators of the
Uruguay Round, although they opposed, right up until the last weeks of
negotiations, the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which they
considered a "useless burden". When the establishme nt of the new
organisation became inevitable, they put pressure to call the organisation the
"World Trade Organisation" instead of the "Multilateral Trade
Organisation" which is the title currently used in Geneva, during the
preparatory works, but that the Americans were rejecting because it was directed
too conspicuously against their bilateral or rather unilateral tendencies.(2)
- Bilateralism: The success of the Uruguay Round and the birth of the WTO did
not calm down the 'bilateralist' temptations of the United States. The latter
apply the policy qualified as "managed commercial flows", founded on
the conclusion of the bilateral agreements fixing quantitative objectives in the
commercial exchanges between two countries (for example the bilateral
negotiations with Japan or China).
- Unilateralism: This in p articular involves the excessive recourse by the
American Administration towards the procedures of Section 301 of the legislation
on the external trade of the United States. This mechanism authorises the White
House to bring to bear retaliation measures against the countries whose
commercial practices, judged "disloyal", would break American
exportation. This "aggressive unilateralism" has led certain countries
- South Korea, Brazil,... - to increase importation of American products to the
detriment of other suppliers. This procedure "is the brutal translation, in
the sphere of international trade, of the law of the strongest. By excluding all
attempts at conciliation of interests present in order to resolve a commercial
conflict, Section 301 has for vocation to impose commercial retaliations beyond
all mul tilateral control. This procedure hence contributes to the
destabilisation of the multilateral trade system by working around the procedure
for dispute settlement and the research for solutions negotiated between
commercial partners that are equal in right." (3)
- Regionalism: The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), entered into
effect in January 1995, is considered as the United States' riposte to the
shifting power positions on the international ladder, notably those related to
the progress of the European construction and to the integration of the Asian
economies.
European commercial diplomacy: European construction undoubtably constitutes one
of the important tendances in the world economy. The extent and the power of the
European market, the quality of its active population, its scientific and
technological vitality, the influence of its cultures, its casting place in
international exchanges, the attraction it exercises on neighbouring zones...,
so many elements that explain the important imposing of the European Union (EU)
in the economic fate of our planet. Certain "soothsayers" notably in
the United States and Japan - even consider that the European Union will be the
dominant economic power of the XXIst Century. This enthusiasm contrasts
strangely with the many incertitudes weighing on the European construction in
the current phase of its evolution. Actually, the EU appears to have a difficult
time adapting itself to great turbulences of the post-cold-war period. Its
internal balances, heavily founded on the Bonn-Paris axis, are beginning to
suffer due to the effects of the German reunification. The conflict between the
federal and confederate logic appears to be eternal. Its inescapable enlargement
risks accentuating its destabilisation. The new relations that it wants to
establish with the Third World are far from founded on precise orientations.
During the Uruguay negotiations, European trade diplomacy often seemed to be
drifting. The world's number one export power, the European community certainly
had interest in the correct unfolding of the cycle whose official objective was
the reinforcement of international commercial regulations. However, the
principal themes of the negotiations - agriculture, services, intellectual
property - were defined from the very beginning by the Americans. The
agricultural file, in particular, aimed to emphasize the problem of community
grants. In th is important field, the American crusade against the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has progressively pushed Europe into position of
defence. Community diplomacy often gave an impression of being weak, and
appeared to be leading a rearguard combat in order to refuse any reform of the
CAP, which was thirty years old. This reform finally came on the 21st May 1992,
interpreted, by a large part of international public opinion, as a
"retreat" caused by international pressure. During the larger
international trade reunions which took place later (in particular the different
ministerial conferences of the WTO, especially the one in Seattle in 1999),
Europe did not succeed in retaking the initiative.
Unbeknownst to Section 301 of the exterior trade legislation of the United
States, the European Community had put into place in 1984 the "New
Instrument of Commercial Policy" (NICP). This instrument was conceived to
permit the Community to struggle against illicit commercial practices of other
countries. It was little used, most of all due to disagreements in the midst of
the European Community. The NICP was replaced, in 1994, by the ROC (Regulations
concerning Obstacles to Commerce). It gives to the Commission
"inquisitorial powers of control over and of inquiry into obstacles against
commerce, including those finding their source in other countries". It is
necessary to specify that the ROC "distinguishes itself radically from
those instruments of commercial policy permitting to impose unilaterally
commercial retaliation measures beyond the WTO's own multilateral
procedures"; (4)
The main fields of conflict
The failure of the WTO's third mini sterial conference at Seattle (30th November
till 3rd December 1999) was essentially due to misunderstandings between the
Americans and the Europeans, in particular in the agriculture sector: the
Europeans want to preserve agricultural "specificity", whereas the
Americans consider agriculture as "a sector amongst others".
Certainly, the European Union in 1992 accepted the CAP (Common Agricultural
Policy) and the progressive reductions in exportation subsidies. Even so, it
refuses the total elimination of these subsidies. The Europeans are not hostile
to the liberalisation of the commerce in agricultural products, based on one
condition, that this liberalisation will not threaten the
"multifunctionality" of agriculture (its function of protecting the
environment, preservation of rural employment and producti on of high quality
food products).
The "banana war", it too, has seriously poisoned Euro-American
commercial relations. In 1997, the WTO dispute settlement office condemned the
European Union to modify the organisation of its banana market, which was
privileging banana importation from its former colonies, to the detriment of
American firms implanted in five countries of Latin America. Faced with
prevarication in Brussels, the Americans took severe sanctions against European
imports.
The ORD equally condemned measures taken by the European Union forbidding
importation of "hormone-fed" beef coming from the United States. In
order to "punish" the European attitude concerning this file (as with
that of the banana) the Americans installed a mechanism of "revolving
commercial sanctions" which consisted in renewing every six months the list
of sanctio ned products. This system, baptised the "carrousel", leads
to exercising a more important pressure on the whole of the European economy.
As for the European Union, it threatened, in September 2000, to seek recourse
before the WTO dispute settlement office, if the United States would not
suppress the fiscal advantages that they have granted to their export
enterprises. This is the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) program that allows
American businesses to reduce their fiscal charge, by installing phantom
agencies in fiscal paradises (Barbados, the Virgin Islands,...). This involves,
according to the European Union, of exportation subsidies offered to American
companies. The European Union estimates that in 1999, the amount of these
disguised subsidies amounted to four billion dollars. The European Union
condemns just as vigorously the American extraterritorial laws: this means the
Helms-Burton Law of 12th March 1996 (which applies to enterprises investing in
Cuba), and the Amato-Kennedy Law of 5th August 1996 (concerning businesses
investing in the gas and petrol sectors in Iran and Libya). These laws
"impose on the States, legislation that they have neither chosen nor
accepted...." They ignore the dispositions of international public law, but
they "also contravene the WTO's multilateral regulations, which condemn
restrictions of all sorts on the liberty of exchange". In the complaint
that it has deposited before the WTO, the European Union "estimates notably
that all of these measures are in conflict with the GATT of 1994". (5)
These conflicts and many more have poisoned commercial relations between the
United States and the European Union. They have also been very tough with the
WTO?s dispute settlement system.
It is necessary to specify that this system has not succeeded in putting an end
to the unilateral commercial practices of the States. The dispute settlement
mechanism is an essential element for ensuring the security and the foreseeable
planning of the multilateral commercial system. The members of the WTO engaged
themselves to not act in any unilateral manner when that would mean that
commercial regulations would be broken. This engagement was aiming at limiting
the use of unilateral measures, especially on the part of the United States
across section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. The United States consider that the
application of unilateral measures by means of section 301 st ill remains
possible in a number of sectors which are not at all or very little affected by
the obligations created by the WTO. This position can only weaken the system.
American unilateralism, one already knows, manifests itself also in the United
States' laws of an extraterritorial quality. In these two domains, the WTO still
has not taken any sanctions against the United States and hence clearly
manifests the weakness and ineffciency of the organisation.
Notes (1) CARRON DE LA CARRIERE (Guy), La diplomatie économique : le diplomate et le marché, Economica, 1998, P. 28. (2) PACE (Virgile), L'Organisation mondiale du commerce et le renforcement de la règlementation juridique des échanges commerciaux internationaux, L'Harmattan, 2000, P. 131 (3) PANTZ (Dominique), Institutions et politiques commerciales internationales : du GATT à l'OMC, Armand Colin, 1998, P. 59. (4) ibid., P. 178 (5) PACE (Virgile), Op. Cit., P. 142-143. |