Internal and external dynamics
Gilles Bertrand
The year 2000 which has just finished and 2001 which began are the pretext of
multiple totals, on everything and it does not matter on what, the international
press competing in grandiloquent and sensational titles on "the
event if the millennium" (or "century") whatever it was in the
field of arts, in economy, policy, etc. Obviously this type of approach is
european- even, more globally, Christian - concentrated, even if the
westernization of the world has almost generalized the Christian calendar. Many
others are interested why it is the hour of totals... Turkey, in history, is one
of the first "victim" or "beneficiary" (following its
position towards this phenomenon) of this westernization. Turkey thus celebrated
the passage to the 21st century, as all the States, which have this calendar
there. Is it necessary for this to make an assessment? It would not have any
sense, no more in any case as for all other States. The historians themselves
speak about "The short Twentieth century: from 1914 to 199l ". The
hour of assessment would thus be passed! For these different reasons, it is not
an assessment that we would like to make here, but more precisely to an analysis
of Turkey position, marked by two major events: the inscription of Turkey on the
list of the candidates-states to adhere to the European Union (EU) during the
summit of Helsinki in December 1999, and the elections, in May 2000, of a new
president of the Republic, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, apparently resolute to promote
significant constitutional reforms.
Really there are two events to be analyzed, but they reveal mainly the internal
and external evolutions which affect Turkey. These evolutions are in narrow
correlation, but there is maybe truism to repeat it here. The turkish political
scene was never isolated from the international scene since the multi-party
system was established from the Second world war ended, when the turkish
government decided to integrate the Organization of the agreement of the
Northern Atlantic (NATO). The Turkish society is increasingly opened to the
exterior from this epoch, if it was not enough before. And this phenomenon of
openness was sped up since the '60 with the emigration of several hundreds
thousands of the Turkish citizens to the Western Europe, then, since the middle
of the ' 80, owing toTurgut Ozal liberal policies, for the trade and the media.
The European integration poses however many challenges: In terms of
democratization, especially as to the role of militaries in the political life;
in economic terms, the correlation between a growth relatively forceful and an
accelerated inflation not being accepted by the EU; in political- social-
economic terms, the request of a relative social cohesion ensuring the stability
of the system permitting the adhesion in the EU colliding to the difference
between the rural and/or poor and the urban middle classes, between Turkey from
west, economically dynamical and political dominant and Turkey from east,
economically under-developed and politically unstable owing to the not -
solution of the Kurdish conflict and it despite of other main recent event,
namely Abdullah Ocalan capture in February 1999. So, far from putting an end to
the guerilla lead by the organization that he is the chief, The party of
Kurdistan Workers (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK), this capture risks to be
only an episode of the conflict if the Turkish government does not make any
serious offer to the requests more and more minimum but deciding of the
"Kurdish", especially on the problem of cultural rights. So this
problem is one of those which the organs of the EU, namely of the Commission and
of the Parliament, consider as primary in the process of Turkey adhesion.
EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL INTERNAL SCENE
Ergun Ozbudun, in a recent work on the problem of " the consolidation
of the democracy " in Turkey, underlines this paradox that the multi-party
system in Turkey was installed in 1945 but there took place three coup d'etat
(in May 1960, in March 1971, in September 1980), and the same amount of phases
of crisis before the impact and before the transition to a government issued
from the elections after the impact2. However, every coup d'etat differ from the
precedent: that from 1960 has finally succeeded to the elaboration of the
most liberal constitution which Turkey has known; that from 1971 limited to
"memorandum" of the militaries then to the inauguration of a technical
government during three years; the impact from 1980 was the most brutal and the
constitution imposed by the militaries very much restrictive as the public
freedoms concern, and always acting. It does not remain less than three impacts
were marked by extreme violence: the execution of the liberal Prime minister
Adnan Menderes (1961), the very cruel repression against the organizations of
the extremely - left-hand side and in a least measure of the extremely - right
party in 1971, even a more rigid and longer repression in 1980.
From 1983 up to 1991, Turkey knew some governmental stability, contrasting
hardly with the instability of the 1970. In 1993 a new period of instability
opened which culminated between 1996 and 1998. Where are we today? In a
configuration of a political system doubly paradoxical: a government of
coalition joining the worse enemies of the 1970; the decline of the liberal
right party which triumphed in the 1980 and at the beginning of the 1990 but
which assists to the victory of its program applied by the others. The
legislative elections in April 1998 have really referred to the authority a
strange coalition between the kemalist of a left-hand side managed by Bulent
Ecevit inside DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti, Left-side Democratic Party) and the
ultra-nationalists of the right-side MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Party of
the national Movement) based by the late colonel Alparslan Turkeo but managed today
by the economist, Devlet Bahceli. The third partner of the coalition, the
liberal but nationalist party ANAP (Anavatan Partisi, The party of the Mother
country) founded by Turgut Ozal and managed by Mesut Yilmaz, is not more than a
shadow of that it was in the '80. His opponent he is also liberal and
nationalist, DYP (Dofiru Yol Partisi, Party of the fair way), founded by
Suleyman Demirel and managed by Tansu Ciller, it is also in constant decline.
ANAP and DYP will lose electors for the benefit of MHP and Fasili Partisi (Party
of Bravery) managed by Pecai Kutan, founded in December 1997 in view of Rafah
Partisi interdiction (Party of Prosperity) of Necmettin Erbakan, accused of
political Islam.
To complete this rapid scheme of the turkish political, we have to quote the
party founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk himself, CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,
Republican Party of the People), who changed many times its name after the
period of interdiction by the military regime (1980-1983) and it seems to aim
by personalities struggle, even a crisis of the identity: to remain kemalist of
the left-hand side or to become a public democratic party of the western
european model? The problem is important: or the party is situated, "grosso
modo", on the same terrain as DSP (which is not more than CHP dissident)
and finds itself in direct competitiveness with him in the electorate, or it
affirms more progressive and more open positions, namely in the Kurdish problem
(that (he begun to make) and can then to be situated more clearly on DSP
left-hand side and in case of necessity re-conquest votes by little bit
small parties as ODP (Ozgurluk ve Dayaneoma Partisi, Party of freedom and
solidarity) even in a pro - kurdish party HADEP (Halk Demokrasi Partisi,
Democratic Party of People). HADEP reaches hardly to exceed 4,5 % of voices at
the legislative election at national level but collects between 20 and 40 % of
the suffrages in Kurdish provinces (Turkey Southeast). However, the electoral
code stipulates that it is necessary to receive at least 10 % of voices at a
national level to send deputies to the Large national Assembly of Turkey, that
limits the operating proportional system and avoid of great splitting up in the
Assembly, but also deprives small parties of representation.
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS in TURKEY With 1987
In 1983, ANAP, again created, carries away 45,1 % of the suffrages and the
absolute majority of siege in the national Assembly against 2 parties
connected with the military regime and which disappears soon. The elections from
1987 constitutes, unless a returning to the previous political system, the first
ones of the present.
Is the Turkish voter versatile? More precisely strategist and powerless face to
a political system which has difficulties to be reformed as a consequence of the
conservatism of some chiefs and of the surveillance exercised by the militaries.
Barrier of 10 % at the national scale favors undoubtedly the large parties. But
these make rarely alliances before the elections, which will have already as
result to enlighten the voter about possible coalitions.
|
Partis |
% |
siéges |
% |
siéges |
% |
siéges |
% |
siéges |
|
|
1987 |
1991 |
1995 |
1999 |
||||
|
ANAP |
36,3 |
297 |
23,9 |
115 |
19,6 |
132 |
13,2 |
86 |
|
DYP |
19,1 |
59 |
27,3 |
178 |
19,2 |
135 |
12,1 |
85 |
|
DSP |
8,5 |
- |
10,7 |
7 |
14,6 |
75 |
22,1 |
136 |
|
CHP |
24,7 |
99 |
20,7 |
88 |
10,7 |
50 |
8,7 |
- |
|
MHP |
2,9 |
- |
alliance : |
8,2 |
- |
18,1 |
129 |
|
|
RP/FP |
7,1 |
- |
16,9 |
62 |
21,4 |
158 |
15,2 |
111 |
The national Assembly counted 450 sieges for the elections from
1987 and 1991, 550 residences (sieges) since 1995. In 1999, 3 deputies are
without label but were elected due to the party support.
THE THREE MAIN IDEOLOGICAL POLES
Only the Refah Partisi (RP) and the MHP were thus allied, only one time, in
1991 after reading lessons of their not - representation in the parliament
issued from the elections from 1997. Dependent from circumstances, this union
was based also on numerous points common ideological and programmatic, beginning
with the turkish-Islamic synthesis defined by Etienne Copeaux.
" An ideological Islam form [which], instead proposes a withdrawal on
the unique Koran valors, (...) advocate a returning to the "turkish
national culture ", considered as a product of a synthesis between the pure
past of Turks, on one hand, and Islam on the other hand. According to these
views, Islam transcended the Turkish culture, which, without it, would not
survived; but the Turkish culture has protected and fortified Islam, which
without it, would become fossilized.
Certainly, the two parties diverge on the importance accorded to the Islam in
the Turkish society, but this divergence is relatively minor in relation with
the convergence points. Mainly, RP was prohibited in February 1998 after the
decision of the constitutional Court, its successor, FP, is weakened, and any
coalition with it is susceptible to attract the militaries anger which have
already succeeded to impede the prolongation of the coalition RP-DYP (Refahyol)
in 1997. To vote for FP is not almost "useful" to reinstate the
vocabulary of the political parties and it is not necessary thus to be surprised
that a part of the RP voters preferred to vote MHP or abstained.
Another possible union in view of ideological proximity, ANAP-DYP (Anayol) is
named by their desire by the numbers of central- right side personalities,
members of one or other party or of their dissidents from where one and \ or
other, but without successes until now despite of several attempts after the
elections from 1995. The two integrated parties could then pretend to the
absolute majority in the parliament. And the general purposes are numerous: the
liberalization of the economy, beginning with the privatization rapprochement
even an integration in the EU, but social conservatism and nationalism,
moderation towards the requests in Islam's favor. Certainly, the two parties
have different histories: DYP is the successor of liberal successive parties,
since the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes in the 1950, victim of three
"coup d'etat". ANAP, on the contrary, has appeared in the favor of the
interdiction of the traditional political parties after State impact in 1980.
Turgut Ozal, close to the political Islam in the '70 Th and sympathizing to the
turkish-Islam synthesis, participates at first in government established by the
militaries in 1980. It keeps saves however the distance with them. ANAP, founded
before the elections from 1983, is allowed to participate, but with reticence,
that it practically makes an opposition to the army. Huri Tursan shades however
this analysis:
Turgut Ozal settles down in current "reagano-thatcherian" ultra
liberal of the 80ís. His successor at the head of the party, Mesut Y lmaz, is
not able to mobilize voters on this direction. Also he will fail to collapse the
image of the technocrat and feeds a strong (mutual) hostility for his competitor
DYP, Tansu Ğiller. The last one became head of the DYP in June 1993 after
elections of the founder and the Prime Minister, Siileyman Demirel, in the post
of the president of the Republic while she has just arrived in the politics. But
she has quickly lost the initial political credit: financial crisis of 1994, the
union with the RP in 1996, a choice ìabsolutely repressiveî in relation to
Kurdish guerrila, whence a deviation of the Mafiosi and militarized
"kontrgerilla," politico-financial scandals have mixed her husband, Ozel
Ciller... The journalist Dofiu Ergil will even nickname her the Turkish version
of "Calamity Jane""5. Tansu Ciller is generally responsible for the
decline of the DYP. So, ANAP and DYP will register accounts, almost - identical
to the last two elections to Legislative assembly. Moreover, if this decline
proceeds, it is possible, that two parties will not be submitted more in
parliament during the nearest elections to parliament, because that parties do
not achieve 10 % of necessary suffrages. In this case, the new structure of the
Turkish right side makes no doubt. Meanwhile, at this time, it is very probable,
that voters of these two organizations, become more and more numerous to turn to
the MHP or FP. However, the MHP is already the capital beneficiary party of the
decline of the right side, due to the moderate image which , Deviet Bah eli
gives to himself. This economist conducted an effective election campaign in
1999. He advised then to his military personnel to leave their remarkable duty
ñ an identifying strong politic marker in Turkey - for not frighten the voters
of the center.
The third pole of the turkish political is made from two parties occuring from
the ex-unique kemalist party - CHP. CHP itself has much changed from the 50ís,
but at a loss to define a clear line in relation to democration, in relation to
a role of militaries and in relation to kurdish quest. Above DSP is dominated by
the figure of Bulent Ecevit (as much as he will live), born in 1925, - it is
doubtless, that he leads the DSP. And as long as he will supervise DSP, it is
sure that there will be no rapprochement with the CHP. The two parties which are
named social democrats, are not able, anyway, to form a majority coalition. The
left voters pass from one to another well, go to parties with a clearer policy
as the ODP and HADEP.
The Coalitions of Conditions
Quarrels of persons, politicians vote-catching, ideologically vague, military
intervention, all this explains, that any ideological poles that we have just
mentioned was translated by long-term plots, the unions, are made against one or
several parties, or behind absence in the political parties which have arrived
on the head of such parties as: DYP-CHP between 1991 and 1995 against ANAP;
ANAP-DSP in 1997-1998 against RP / FP and DYP; RP-DYP in 1996, DSP-MHP in 1999.
Still union RP-DYP was made between the party demanding moderate political Islam
and a party, which asks the strict control of Sunnis, by the State for the name
of the kemalism. In addition, frequently, a third party, participating or being
content to support the government, avoiding disputed appointments.
In the present coalition, ANAP plays a role of "buffer" between
parties that have in common only their adherence to the sovereignty of Turkey
and to Turkish nationalism. The difference, and it is of size, that the MHP has
called fascist sources, certainly is ever less and less, required from the death
of colonel T rke O., while DSP settles down faster on a line inspired with
nationalism of the Third world. However, ANAP does not make an evident image:
Mesut Y lmaz, as the assistant of the Prime Minister, is on care of documents of
the nominee of Turkey in EU. As to the program of a privatization of the public
enterprises, the question there is a theme of campaign of the ANAP. MHP would be
constrained in less strong theme in the popular electorate. As to DSP, it is
obviously a problem for its internal connection. So, the influential Mumtaz
Soysal, deputy DSP up to 1999, the constitutional teacher of the right and the
political science recognized and the author of an editorial article in the daily
newspaper Hurriyeris one of the boasters of this privatization. These
deprivations should concern several state banks, from which Ziraat Bankas ; 24 %
of Turkish Airlines and 33,5 % Turk Telecom should be issued also.
In spite of everything, the coalition will celebrate in April 2001 two years of
existence, a record from the end of coalition DYP-CHP (1991-1995). Therefore,
this coalition had much more reorganization of the cabinet, than the present. It
risks meanwhile to know more and more turbulence during 2001 in view of
financial crisis, in view of absence of measures for the benefit of Kurds and
for the benefit of achievement of democratization, and also, may be more
surprisingly, of the critics directed to the new president of Republic.
the PRESIDENT of the REPUBLIC
TO FOLLOW...
The 10-th president of the Republic of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, elected in
May 2000, causes curiosity of observers under many attitudes. First, he is not
neither the former general, nor the politician of the foreground as two
predecessors, Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel, but the former chairman of the
Constitutional court. Second, he is not close to a party or to another, but it
is considered as " the adhered to republican and secular values ",
that means only, that he is not close to "Fazilet Partisi" - it is the
less that we can say , because under his presidency the Constitutional court has
struck "Refah Partisi" interdiction! Thirdly, Ahmel N. Sezer was
elected in strange circumstances while the government wished to improve the
establishment to allow to Suleyman Demirel to carry out the second mandate and
despite a spirit of frond from the deputies of a coalition which preferred other
candidates. At last, instead of proving constrained as it seems, that the
government hoped for him, the new President does not lose to use the
prerogatives to criticize the governmental action, even machinery of state, even
not democratic intentions of the constitution.
Let us remind, that the president of the Republic of Turkey is elected by the
Grand National assembly for the unique mandate of seven years. Prerogatives are
not thin, even if they are smaller, than those of the French president, and,
especially, his American colleague. The president appoints the prime Minister
and receives his resignation, appoints and will dislocate ministers under the
offer of the prime Minister, heads the Council of Ministers which he convokes,
names the chief of the armies, decides of the use of armed forces, proclaims the
wartime law or state of emergency, marks and ratifies the international
contracts, may ask the National assembly to reexamine a law or to refer to the
Constitutional court. In judicial subject, he appoints members of this same
Court and a quarter of the state members of the council, and also the general
public prosecutor near Court of cassation.
These widespread powers are the heritage of a military regime. Still they were
reduced, when Turgut Ozal were the prime Minister, to resist to the general
Kenan Evren, the author of revolution 1980 and to the president of Republic up
to 1989. Becoming president, Ozal was distinguished mainly by the behavior of
foreign policy, during war of the Gulf and also by the appointment of the chief
of armies who was not the candidate of militaries. Nevertheless, he appeared
isolated after the defeat of the party, ANAP, in elections of 1991. Suleyman
Demirel played a role in a half-tainted: he judged constantly the quarrels
between the leaders of parties who were not able to come to the agreement (Mesut
Y lmaz and Tansu Ciller), knowing to be above fight, but, at the same time he
has always obeyed the wishes of militaries, mainly against Necmettin Erbakan and
RP. Suleyman Demirel has also made nothing for the benefit of Kurds while his
predecessor was placed in searches of the political decision since 1991 and
while he, being the Prime Minister between 1991 and 1993, had some brave
declarations.
In view of absence of connection of a coalition, the government wished that
Suleyman Demirel has carried out the second mandate, but the necessary
constitutional addition was rejected by the deputies (303 voices contra to 177
for) one month before the elections. Thus, it was necessary to find the
candidate. The minimal consent was reached around Ahmet N. Sezer, born in 1941
which has made his career in the magistracy entering into the Constitutional
court in 1988. They could be prepare for a weakness of presidential function, or
at least for its neutralization. There is nothing from this, at least instantly.
Really Ahmet N. Sezer has already drawn attention of the mass-media, a year
before the elections, in April 1999 by a very strong speech about the
constitutional reforms which should be carried out to lift restrictions in a
freedom of speech. During investiture in the post of the president, he promised
to amplify "the Legal and Democracy State "6 In July 2000, he judges
the conflict, opposing the state device responsible to watch the higher
education (YOK) and the university of Izmir concerning the assignment of the
rector. YOK should submit three names to the head of the state who appoints thus
the rector of each university though the elections took place among teachers. In
the case of Izmir, the president has decided to meet YOK (which depends on the
Prime Minister) naming the candidate who has received the majority of the
teachersí voices but was not on the list of YOK. In August, the president
refuses to sign the decree, allowing to cancel the employees suspected of
Islamic or Kurdish in an occasion which such measures should be a subject of
law. In September, the same opposition in the government. Being asked to submit
the decision on the privatization in parliament, more than legislate by decree.
October, the 1st, during the speech opening the parliamentary session, the
president has given a lesson of the law in the government and demanded the
constitutional reforms going to the direction of democratization. In December,
he opposes the veto to the law of controversy amnesty, that demands the second
voting in parliament 7. This same month, he does not renew the mandate (arrived
in expiry of the term) the general public prosecutor near the Supreme court,
Vural Savao, considered as close to militaries and which recommended
interdiction Refah Partisi then demanded - unsuccessfully - that of the HADEP.
However, the president proves more moderately, that his ex-colleague the
chairman of the Supreme Court, Sami Selcuk. This last has solemnly opened the
judicial years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 by some extremely critical speeches not
only about the constitution of 1982 imposed by the militaries, and also support
of republic kemalist as a branch which is translated mainly by the control from
the state of the DIB (Diyanet Ioleri Baokanl , Management of religious affairs)
on Sunnis 8.
Questioning the AUTHORITY OF MILITARIES?
These speeches, about the constitution of 1982 and also the affair of the decree
on the cancellation of the employees aim the militaries. This decree has as
origin the recommendation of National security council (Milli Guven Kurulu, MGK
9) of February 1997 which was actually an ultimatum directed to the prime
Minister Necmettin Erbakan for him to take measures against the entry of the
militaries of his own party, Refah, in the state! Considerably, that it will be
figures occurring of a judicial body, instead of the politics, who mention
henceforth regularly the role of militaries in political activity.
Lawyers occur as unique, capable to criticize the constitution not being accused
of attempt at safety of the state or separatism. Such constitutional teacher of
the right regards " constitutional but not democratic " constitution.
Such professor of constitutional law, B lent Tan r, exposes the existence of 800
laws ordered by a military regime between 1980 and 1983, which escape, according
to one of these laws, from any constitutional control. Many lawyers declare, on
the example of the president of the Republic, that it is not necessary to reform
only the constitution, but to ratify other one.
On the part of politicians, Turgut Ozal is the unique, between 1987 and 1993
which has managed to impose decisions of civil authority to militaries. With
1993, political leaders have left these last to return the lost situation: the
system established by the constitution of 1982 has probably better functioned
(from the point of view of army) under Suleyman Demirel, than under Turgut Ozal.
It is paradoxical if we think, that militaries have wanted to remove finally
from political activity in 1980! Other opponent in interventions of militaries
in political system, Billent Ecevit has reconciled in part with them in 1974 due
to the intervention in Cyprus, and it seems henceforth subordinate to accept
their instructions. The army seems to overcome its internal divisions, more
seen, in 1960 and 1970. The kemalist, at least in the interpretation which is
given from 1980, makes the base of the consent which reigns among the supreme
officers. Whence two priorities of the year: the preservation of the unity the
state, with extreme jacobism; the struggle against political Islam. Officers and
the corporals suspicious of sympathy to it are removed regularly from army. This
seems to induct or a paranoia of headquarters to the infiltration of Islamic or
so-called, or real infiltration of active workers of RP/FP RP/FP and also other
groups, illegal and severe, on the image of "H zbullah", and it is
probably the two phenomena.
The struggle of militaries against the political Islam however is paradoxical.
The army used the monk against the extreme-left after revolution 1980, the
following behind anticommunist strategy, that the USA have encouraged in
Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Hîzbullah manipulated as the tool of punishment in
relation to guerilla PKK10. As it is casual, the police and the army have
managed to break Hîzbullah (January - February 2000) after the capture of
Abdullah Ocalan (February 1999) and the easing of the guerilla.
Taking in prison of the Kurdish chief does not settle however, the Kurdish
question 11. Putting away the law of March 1991 allowing the use of
Kurdish language in private life, Kurds have not received any cultural right.
Decentralization, which might play their favor, is still a part of projects of
the government. Let's remind, that Turkey counts about 65 million inhabitants
and that its area is of 1,5 times larger than that of France (i.e. 770 000 km2).
The French decentralization is not certainly a model of a sort and to give some
additional powers to territorial Assembly of Corsica, establishes already
insuperable problems on a political class. But Turkey appears in the position
close to France 1960: not only there is no region but only departments of very
various sizes, but prefects (vali) are appointed by the government though their
authority was counterbalanced by the elected departmental assembly, on the
example of the general council in France. Therefore, beginning with 1993, PKK
does not demand the independence of Kurdistan but its independence. And before
the capture of the chief, the requirement was softened faster: a position
similar to the one known by Corsica, might satisfy even a military and weakened
politically guerilla. It is fair, that PKK - is an organization practicing the
cult of the unlimited figure. The capture of Abdullah Ocalan, then his
declaration asking returning of his active workers, then the kemalist credo 12
during his process provoked alive debate inside PKK. Nevertheless the active
workers continue to recognize "Apo" ("uncle", a nickname
d'Ocalan) as their chief.
The position is blocked thus. The fights proceed, but mainly in the Iraqi
Kurdistan where the Turkish army conducts regularly retaliatory departures
against the camps PKK from 1994. The two Iraqi Kurdish watches, the patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (UPK) Jalal Talabani, and the democratic party of Kurdistan
(PDK) from the clan Barzani, not being able to agree between them, object to the
introduction PKK in this grey zone which makes the north of Iraq. In 1996-97,
PKK has benefited fights between two parties so that to hire young Iraqi Kurds.
PDK was combined with the Turkish government against PKK, but henceforth UPK
meets in military the guerrillas came from Turkey. PKK may survive in full
military defeat due to the introduction in Kurdish immigration of Turkey in
western Europe13. On the part of the Turkish government, discussion of the
sanction of transfers of radio and TV as the Kurd does not differ still. DSP and
ANAP for this purpose would be faster favorable, when MHP is against. Still the
question is competing to Kurdish TV Med-TV (becoming recently Media-TV) which
transfers from the Western Europe despite of the pressure which has been carried
out by the turkish government to force to forbid to do it. It means that the
question of decentralization and that of sanctions of the learning (deprived
certainly) of Kurdish language are far away to be solved. The official version
of the conflict is that Kurds are victims of backwardness. The financial help
follows one after another thus, but without a big success and there is GAP (Güneydofiu
Anadolu Projesi, the Project for Anatolia the Southeast). The question is of the
huge project which includes the construction of 22 obstacles, among which the
famous obstacle Atatürk, 19 hydroelectric stations and very numerous projects
of an irrigation, which should concern 9,5 % of the common area of Turkey (i.e.
two time Belgium) and the same interest of the population. This project should
promote development of region. The negative point is that lakes of a deduction
should overflow 200 villages (not considering places of excavation) 14, that
promotes to annoy the population and feeds the opposition of PKK which counts
the project as an enterprise of the "turkish colonization" of
Kurdistan. And GAP uses mainly in region Urfa and Gaziantep where PKK was not
very much introduced ever.
The creation of the Kurdish State occurring from a north branch of Iraq, of the
southeast of Turkey and the Iranian provinces (from which that, named officially
Kurdestan) more than before utopian thus, limits of Turkey, Iraq and Iran, they
are condemned meanwhile to remain "a grey zone" where the sovereignty
and the control above of the States is partial and unsure? The fatalism seems to
prevails up to the European and American Ministries of Foreign Affairs. One of
provided decisions is however, the decentralization of the quoted States, which
might be accompanied by some degree of independence of three Kurdish regions.
The unity of the three States would not be again but the question of entering
the principle of addition into the constitution. The central governments would
not more accept by themselves the decisions for Kurds and in the present
paranoia, that is, in the idea of giving the least cultural right, represents
the opening of the "Pandora box" and conducts directly to
secession. But such constitutional changes assume democratization (in Iran and
in Iraq) and its deepening in Turkey. They assume also the easing as to problems
of minority.
ANOTHER PROBLEM of MINORITY: THE ONE OF THE ALEVIS
The question of the place of the Alevi in the society and the Turkish
political activity makes the connected problem of a Kurdish question and sends
to that of autonomy of Turkish noncommercial association of persons. The alevism
is considered as a branch of the Shiite but should have no connection
with the Iranian form. Alevis do not observe the same practice, as other
Moslems; neither pray in a mosque, nor a post on Ramada, nor any other holiday
marked by the Sunnis and the Shiites. The Alevies have their own
holidays, in their own temples (" houses of Cern "),
However, the very important support given to the extreme - left movements
in the Alevis community has turned suspicious in the authority's eyes and in
particular of the military regime from 1980. More recently, in July 1993, the
Alevis intellectuals and/or of the left side were the purpose of the Sunni
extremists who have put fire to the hotel Sivas where they were joined within
the framework of a festival . 37 dead persons. 33 persons judged for this crime
were condemned to the capital punishment (that is a subject of a moratorium in
Turkey) at the moment of their processes in November 1997. In March 1995, the
attack against the Alevis by an armed group in Gazi stambouliot popular
district has caused a manifestation of the first and the interference of the
police and of the army, caused 23 dead and 250 injured. If these explosions of
violence occur as epiphenomenons they have mobilized a community divided
on the size to give to the Alevis identity, in particular between a kemalist
wing who worries mainly about the growth of the political Islam, and the groups
more to the left which link the persecutions against the Alevis with the absence
of the democratization progress, with the not - settlement of the Kurd problem
and with the rise of the Islam. The question, is to know if the Alevis identity
can be expressed inside a civil society or if the weakness of the last does not
call by its movement on the political terrain15.
A DYNAMICAL CIVIL SOCIETY
The main Turkey problem is maybe that of the extreme politicization of some
number of questions on whish the State refuses to let the citizens express in a
public space and inside a civil society. The Kurd intellectuals since the years
1960 and 1970 required first of all the right to practice their mother language,
but the favorable guerilla untying of the PKK has allowed to the State
"to protect" (to use a stylish word) the Kurd's problem and to treat
them as enemies. Alevis ask really more spaces for a civil society, more freedom
of the statement, but for the instant any guerilla Alevis was not manifested to
allow to the State "to protect" by the same method the Alevis problem.
And, in parallel, the debate on the religion and the secularization was
"protected", that is that the National Safety Council has seized it as
a primary problem, while the political and the organizations of the civil
society could seem to discuss it. It was in such a way that the militaries have
imposed the prolongation of the obligatory school tutoring from five to eight
years since the entree in 1997. This measure had as a purpose to put an end to
the growing success of the schools of imams' formation (imam hatîp) through
which increasingly schoolboys passed. It was welcomed as indisputable progress
and as the proof that the Turkish militaries were educated people. The western
press would doubtlessly be well informed to decline on the means of Turkish
National education and to compare its budget with that of Defense...
The anti-Communist struggle during the years 1950 then almost civil war in 1970
have widely contributed to politicize excessively all the organizations a priori
having the marks of a civil society (students associations, professional and
other interest groups) as underlines Nilüfer Gole (16). In 1980 and in 1990,
the contributors observe two different movements inside the company. From one
hand, according to Nilüfer Gole, there are happen "a islamization of
poor district" owing to brotherhoods and not governmental organizations
such as female Islam association (17). The problem is that it meets "state
islamization" (Sharia request), more inclined to authoritarian, through
" the electoral Islam" 18, in this case parties named said Islamic,
Refah then Fazilet Partisi. These last built precisely the electoral success on
the work of the motivated adherents issued from prospective organizations to
represent the civil society and on the support of these organizations. There is
thus captivation of these organizations by these parties, that again that question,
the mark "of civil society" which is given in particular by their
contributors. The second movement touches other segment of Turkish population: average urban and westernize classes. According to Atila Eralp, the political
authority, beginning with the militaries since 1980 up to 1983, tried to convert
in a radical manner a politicized population in a mass of consumers (19). To
make from the economy the main stake is it the purpose of the economist who is
first of all Turgut Ozal? It is certain that a part of the middle class of large
cities from the west of Turkey is slightly mobilized by policy and it is more
contracted on a private sphere (career and consumption principally). However, it
is characterized then mainly by its individualism or by a reply on the family,
so socially it is not engaged.
However, the civil society expresses. There are three examples: the businessmen;
mobilization against corruption and the links between the security and the
organized crime organs (affair Susurluk); earthquake in 1999.
The Turkish businessmen contest in a very much visible manner Turkey political
directions. Really, there are some Turkish private organizations. TISK (Türkiye
Ëoveren SendikalarE Konfederasyonu, The confederation of the employee's
syndicate of Turkey) is a classical organization which interferes mainly in
negotiations relating to the salary and public negotiations with the employees
syndicates, following a very conservative approach. TÜSIAD (TÜrk Sanayici ve
ËoadamlarE Dernefii, Association of the Turkish industrialists and
businessmen), based in 1971 by twelve of the most powerful managers of Turkey,
among which two richest, sirs. Koç and Sabancî, pretend to work for "the
general interest", democracy and human rights and more traditional demands
for the benefit of free enterprise (20). Since its foundation, TÜSIAD became
the enterprise group the most influential and also the less indulgent in
relation to the successive governments, criticizing not only the following
economic policy but also, mainly during the years 1990, the almost immobility as
to the reform of the inherited constitution of the military regime and the
democracy recess.
TÜSIAD thus plead for a political solution of the Kurd 's question, by
the voice of the president Halis (chairman Halis) Komili, of the ex-president,
Cem Boyner, and also, in 1996 by that of one of the heritors of Sabancî,
Ozdemir family (21). TÜSIAD has mainly insisted on the democratization. Cem
Boyner founded by himself a party after his departure from the post of the
president of the association, Yeni Demokrasi Hareket (Movement for a new
democracy) which remained marginal on the Turkish political scene. Ishak Alaton,
the president of the holding company Alarto, incriminates "Turkey
antidemocratic system" (22). The report Perspectives on Democratization in
Turkey (in January 1997) made for TÜSIAD, a great noise. Written by an
university command under the direction of the professor Bülent Tanor, the
report recommends a number of constitutional and political reforms, the solution
of the Kurds problem by political means, and the extension of space let for the
civil society. The report recommends also a larger openness of Turkey on Europe
and on the world :
" Turkey future does not lie in isolating itself from the world, on the
contrary it should keep step with global developments. Barriers between the
world and democracy an are being raised one by one. Henceforward, economic and
political relations cannot evolve independently of democracy and human rights.
It is not by increased co-operation with countries less- developed than itself,
but by increased co-operation with developed countries that Turkey can
accelerate its economic growth thereby gaining the competitive impetus required
for the 21st century. " (23)
The report pleads thus for rapprochement with - western countries.
European integration is one of the priorities, unless TÜSIAD priority of the
priorities. The association assigns also to the not governmental organizations
the release to make pressure on the policies on the report much more important
of the democratization:
" A broader-based democracy will certainly not result from this study, nor
will it be realized by TÜSIAD alone. This can only be achieved by those who
adopt the perspectives put forward by this document and who are willing to come
together to reach an agreement on the details. Thus it would only be possible by
the concerted effort of groups such as: not governmental organizations, trade
unions, professional bodies, industrialists and businessmen of association,
whose struggle would be reflected in Parliament by die political parties. After
ail, if we decide that " now is not die right lime, or it is not our
job", then we, as the true sovereigns of this land, who authorize
politicians to represent us in Parliament, we as members of civil society
organizations should ask ourselves this question: If not us - who?, If not now -
when? " (24)
The second example is thus the affaire Susurluk. We remind briefly the facts:
A serious car accident happened on the 3rd November 1996 in this locality at the
western part of Turkey. In one of the vehicles, they found Abdullah çatlî
dead, leader of extreme right accused of heroine traffic, of complicity
in an attempt against the Pope in 1981 and of a "coup d'etat "attempt
in Azerbaijan in 1995. From çatlî side, there was other dead man Hüseyin
Kocadafi, deputy director of Istanbul Safety. Behind the vehicle, it has injured
proprietor: Sedat Bucak, DYP deputy, but mainly afia, that is the chief of the
tribe, Kurd. The safe of the car is full of false documents and arms very
legally registered as belonging to the police. The scandal is huge but the
principal accused in this affaire, Sedat Bucak and Mehmet Afiar, the ancient
chief of Istanbul Safety, minister of Home Affairs (DYP) at the moment of the
accident and quickly doubted, were not still judged in spring 2000: re-elected
deputies at the elections on April 1999, they have received back their
parliamentary inviolability which was bereaved on the 11th of December 1997.
Both Kurds and deputies in Kurd provinces, they have taken part in the"
dirty war " against PKK. Therefore the deputy Sedat Bucak has created its
proper private army, constituted of 2000 people charged to struggle against PKK,
with the approval of Tansu çiller, the chief of the party and Prime Minister at
that time. The parliamentary commission reunited to investigate the links
between of the State organs and the organized crime reveals the progressive
defacement of the boundaries between the police, the secret services (Milli Ëstihbarat
Teokilate, MIT) and gangs. The same persons charged of the anti-terrorist
struggle are involved in settling of scores of mafia type for controlling
the casinos, the conflict in which took part Tansu çiller spouse.
The revelation of the parliamentary investigation commission and media contrast
with the inertness of the political authority and of the justice to punish the
initiators of these derives. Whence the campaign "a minute of darkness for
the constant light " launched by "the initiative of the citizen "
which begins in February 1997 in the large cities: at 9 p.m., every evening, the
participants switch off the light in their houses, then they organize
demonstrating at the candle light. DYP vice-president (with Refah Partisi
ahead) qualifies these demonstrators as "traitors" and the Prime
Minister Necmettin Erbakan defines them as "parasites and conspirators
". The police disperse the demonstrating - a dead man (cordial attack) in
Antalya - then the pressures on the initiators of the project lead to interrupt
their action on the 6-th of April 1997. This mobilization is exemplary: simple
citizens dared to interpellate the State and the government, but without
successes, because it is not the State that bends, but they.
The third example is the earthquake from the 17th of August 1999 in the
northeast part of Turkey. Nobody will know precisely how many persons perished.
17 000 officially, but 30 000 according to the report carried out by the cabinet
of IBS Marketing Research Services consultants 25. This earthquake was obviously
presumable - the unique question being when? - and the anti-seismic norms have
been stated. It doesn't impede that all the world was surprised. The Turkish
citizens have detected that no security plan existed - but the headquarters
proposed to install that it knows how to make: emergency state and martial law.
The army has interfered more lately in relation to the expectations of the
victims of the sinister: it is necessary to say that the principal marine basis,
Golcuk, was in the epicenter of the seism, and that did not help to its
mobilization. The State turned out to be not very efficacious too; The minister
of Public Health Services, Osman Durmuo (MHP), refusing even in a first time the
help come from abroad under the pretext that " the foreign commands do not
understand our style of life and our culture " 26. The red Turkish Half
moon, the non- - governmental organization, did not excel by its performances
and its president, Kemal Demir, had to resign. However, the Turkish society was
hardly mobilized for the benefit of the sinister region: the interurban buses
have brought thousands of volunteers armed by shovels and spades in the cities
touched by the seism. The non governamental organisations proved their
efficiency; the volonteers of one of them, AKUT, have thus rescued 200
persons27. However, these last were accused to be too media-conscious by
the Prime Minister Billent Ecevit. As to the Association of Defense of the
rights of Islamic persons, Mazlum-Der, created by the personalities close to
Refah Partisi, they confiscated funds that it has collected for victims. The
humanitarian organisations were regrouped inside a civil coordination, sign,
there still, of their desires of efficiency, in order not to repeat the errors
too frequently made by the humanitarian organizations which manage sometimes to
compete. IBS Marketing Research of Service questionnaire quoted highly shows
that a month after the seism 60 % of survived people subsisted due to the
private and individual help and not of the State help.
The State too slightly effective, except when the speech goes, " to control
and to punish " to quote the title of Michel Foucault book, a government
which cares first of all to limit the initiatives of the citizens, a dynamical
civil society, which knows, that since the seism of August 1999 that it have to
rely on itself, but who, suddenly demands more transparency and freedom.
Paradoxically, the president Sezer was elected by the deputies, thus by the
political class, while, it is Obvious that his speech is inspired in a large
part from people requests, from a civil society who would love to obtain more
space to exist. A new fact, it disposes of a non-negligible support but
sometimes embarrassing that of European Union, which considers that its vitality
is of the indispensable conditions of a good integration of Turkey. All the
problem is to know till when the European Commission and Parliament are ready to
go in their support of this civil society, and in what measure this support does
not a pretext to the instrumental criticism of the turkish humanitarian
organizations by "the foreigner", or a form of interference.
TURKISH NOMINEE AT THE EUROPEAN UNION
The inscription of Turkey on the list of the States - candidates to the
adhesion at the European Counsel during the summit of Helsinki (the 10-11th of
December 1999) constitutes a victory the turkish diplomacy also big as the
challenge which it throws down. Rejected from the candidate list during the
summit from 12-13-th of December 1997 in Luxembourg, Turkey was then denounced
for the mass violations of the human rights, the absence of progress in
democratization, the military deadlock in Kurd problem, its bad economic
results, that is its non-conformity to the "criterions" stated by the
same european Council during top of Copenhagen in June 1993. More serious, some
responsible democratic Christian affirmed unofficially that Turkey would never
enter a " Christian club" which will be, according to them, the EU.
However Turkey is the most ancient associated State.
The Turkish nominee with an agreement of association with the European Economic
Community (EEC) was presented on the 31-st of July 1959, soon after the Greek
nominee (the 8-th of June). The agreement of association is signed on the 12 of
September 1963 in Ankara and comes into force the 1-st of December 1964. The
coup d'etat from the 12-th of September 1980 conducts EEC to interrupt the
relations with Turkey. The relations EEC- Turkey are renewed only since 1985.
The strategy of Turkey towards a probably integration in the EEC is not
only confused by the military coup d'etat, it does not mainly suffice coherence.
The Turkish government does not seem anxious for rallying its connections with
the EEC only when the attempts to run a foreign policy less strictly pro-western
fail and the economic situation becomes more critical. On the contrary, as soon
as western States of the EEC and/or NATO make an obstacle to the regional
ambitions, the diversification of the foreign policy returns in order of the
day. It is so after the American refusal to let the Turkish army to interfere in
Cyprus in 1964: the relations with the USSR and the Arabian countries improve.
The period 1973-74 is equally crucial: petroleum price increase transform the
countries of the Persian Gulf in more interesting clients while the countries
from the EEC trend to limit their import and interrupt the immigration. The
military interference in Cyprus (1974) involves very negative responses in West;
Greece entrance in the EEC (1981) is translated by a recurrent exercise of a
veto right on the financial assets to Turkey. Therefore, the export and Turkish
emigration are they reoriented to the Near East between 1974 and 1985, the date
of the petroleum shock. The preparatory phase of the Association Agreement
(1964-1972) has limited by the concession of the commercial advantages from the
both sides, and mainly to Turkey detriment in exchange to the mass emigration of
the turkish workers to the Western Europe, mainly to Germany. The transitional
phase, which had originally to take place from 1973 up to 1985, is finally
finished only in 1995. Moreover, Turkey never received free circulation of
persons to the EEC while this measure is explicitly stipulated in the article 12
of the Association Agreement.
It appears that the actual range of the association was not completely
understood inside the political, diplomatic and military elite. Everything
happens as though the EEC was not considered by this elite as NATO economic
pendant - that it was not completely incorrect in the first years of the EEC. At
the same time, the economic problems are subordinate to the political problems.
The kemalist elite wants to prove that they are "western" while MHP
and the tendency said Islamic castigating this proclaimed pro-westerner,
consider EEC as " Christians club" and search for other paths -
therefore: " the Islamic general market" which projects Necmettin
Erbakan from 1973 and that he tries to enter on the agenda in 1996. Turkish
leaders try thus to be a part of the alliance certainly first of all economic
but which increases their presence in the western block during the Cold War and
even then when this block is determined more in relation " to the new
barbarians " in the Near East and in the Balkans. Jean François Bayart are
doubtlessly right to affirm that:
" The External turkish policy has never privileged an
economic development as mean of action (...), permanently, Ankara considered
that the augment of the country economic resources would result from a political
- diplomatic strategy, through the massive assistance which it was supposed to
establish. It was the case, we have seen, at the moment of Turkey adhesion in
the Atlantic Alliance (...). Also, the negotiation of an association agreement
with the EEC seem to have been already dictated - so, however, from the european
side as well as from the turkish side - by considerations first of all political
speculations. It is necessary to recognize, with Mr. A. Birand. that Ankara
never prepared economically its entrance in the General market. " 28
The problem of the sovereignty is particularly sensitive - namely because
of Kurdish requests . The turkish leaders, including Süleyman Demirel and Bülent
Ecevit, have an approach, of the most conservative and classical of the
sovereignty and they are ready neither for "transfers" not for "putting
together" of the turkish sovereignty. The MRP and Fazrlet Partisi are
even less ready to this.
On the 14-th of April 1987, the government Turgut Ozal have however officially
presented their nominee to the adhesion to the EEC. The motivations of the
Turkish Prime minister seem clear: he tries to reduce the weight of the military
in the political life, he wants to transfer the Turkish economy into a liberal
economy, and he appears completely as a modernist. The nominee takes place after
Spain and Portugal adhesion as it was
obvious, that the documents of the adhesion of these two States were not closed,
the Turkish nominee had no chance. The turkish government improves its relations
with Council of the Europe accepting the right of the individual petition
to the European Commission of the Human rights (the article 25 of the European
Convention of the Human rights) the 28-th of January 1987 and recognizes the
mandatory jurisdiction of the European Court of the Human rights (the article 46
of the Convention) the 22 of January 1990. The Council is an organization
distinct from the Community but the Turkish government does not ignore that the
EEC organs are attentive to such political decisions.
But the unique act from1986 provides then the Unique Market for the 1-st
of January 1993 and a new agreement in 1992. The extension in Spain and in
Portugal is thus considered as last up to a new recess phase. In addition,
according to Turkey economic and political position in 1987, not speaking about
the relations with Greece and Cyprus problem, Turgut Ozal could he reasonably
hope of a positive opinion of the Commission? Hoped he that the Opinion will be
positive and that the Commission would accept that the reforms necessary for the
adhesion (and the resolution of the conflict Greek - turkish) be lead parallel
to the negotiations with EEC, allowing thus to the Prime minister to maintain
the pressure on the State apparatus and the military to receive these reforms
and this resolution? The Opinion of the Commission, made on the 18-th of
December 1989 is anyway negative. Nevertheless, the Commission proposes to
advance to the custom union.
Why to accept a custom union before a hypothetical adhesion? The case of Turkey
constitutes an intriguing precedent. This business discloses however the
european-turkish relations and concerns directly Greek - Turkish relations
because to the initial Greek veto succeeds the compromise from the 6-th of March
1995: suspension of veto against the opening of the negotiations between
EU and Cyprus Republic in the favor of its adhesion. The acceptance of this
compromise, as the custom union however, lifted consequently outcry in
Turkey. Not only the Prime minister Tansu Ciler release thus Cyprus documents
for the benefit of Greek Cypriotes, but she proceeds to a real abandon of the
economic sovereignty: from coming into force of the custom union, Turkey has to submit
to the rules and to the common exterior tariff of the EU not
being able (at least theoretically) to the decision.
The argument according to which the not - ratification of this custom
union " would strengthen the camp of those who intend to replace the laical
republic with other concepts which are propagated on the southern side of the
Mediterranean sea as well as in the Near East " (to put it clearly: Islam),
a threat throws out by Turkey permanent representative to the EU, Nihat Akyol
(29), and many times repeated by the State representatives and Tansu Ciller
herself, was already doubtful before Refah Partisi victory at the legislative
elections from the 24th of December 1995 (after the ratification of the
Agreement by european Parliament). The rise in power of Refah Partisi has as
essential objectives the internal Turkish problems. The electoral motivation put
apart, what does happen with the economic aspects? In a first time, the
liberalization of the exchanges with the EU conducts to an aggravation of a
commercial deficit in Turkey. However, according to the report of the World
Bank, Turkey had in an average due date to earn between 1,1 and 1,5 points of
the GIP each year due to the custom union (30). The report turns out to be
globally optimistic about Turkey profits. Tansu Ciller has answered to the
critical articles of the european Parliament as some constitutional dispositions
concern and more generally on the violations of the human rights, she did not
see why the Parliament was interested in it as the Agreement has only a
commercial range... Alternatively, exactly the contrary of the speech about the
symbolical range of the Agreement and its weight against rise in power of the
Islam! Following this logic, the Turkish government has not really accomplished
any of the reforms finally promised to the European Parliament:
" Sixteen amendments to the Constitution have been adopted by the Turkish
national Assembly on the 23-rd of July 1995, by 360 voices against 32, Refah
being the unique party to vote against. It is necessary to mark however, none of
them concerns explicitly the dispositions intended to promote and to protect the
individual rights and liberties, and does not state warranties for the
protection of the human rights. " 31
In these conditions, we do not have to be surprised of the decision of the
European Council of Luxembourg on the12-th and the 13-th of December 1997.
However, Turkish leaders consider that EU has implicitly engaged to examine
favorably their nominee signing the custom union. The refusal supported by
Turkey in Luxembourg conducts to a new crisis in the relations between Turkey
and EU. Paradoxically maybe, the Turkish government does not do anything
officially to remedy to this situation. The decision taken in Luxembourg has in
any case served as a pretext to the Grand National Assembly as to the government
not to undertake new constitutional reforms going to the democratic direction.
After the decision of the top in Helsinki, the parliament as the government find
themselves in front of their responsibilities: if any reform is not undertaken,
it will be difficult to explain to the voters why the EU delays the adhesion of
Turkey. The "partnership of the adhesion " concluded between the EU
and the turkish government on the 4-th of December 2000 and " the strategic
document " of the Commission from the 8-th of November on which it is based
announce already the size of the range of the task. This document describes
really the political and economic reforms, which the Turkish government should
undertake during its processes of negotiations for the adhesion. And this
program is supported by a calendar in "short" (2001) and
"average" terms. The document does not reveal anything new but gives
an idea of task necessary to accomplish, that the observers have already known
that she had to include the resolution of the Kurd and Cypriote problems, (put
in standard) the rate to the european standards of the legislation as the
political rights and the rights of the market concern.
TURKEY EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Does Turkey have a choice? Some will doubtlessly say that the globalization
obliges Turkey to get integrated in the EU if it does not want to appear
isolated in the future international negotiations, on the trade in particular,
in relation to the capital flux, and in the international division of work.
There are the questions that we let to the economists, to envisage mainly Turkey
political relations. And what do we observe? The relative regional isolation of
Turkey and the almost-disappearance of an alternative of its privileged
relations with the West generally and Western Europe particularly. Therefore,
the rapprochement with Greece is so important. Not only to lift the
Greek veto is necessary for the adhesion in the EU but weight of Greece and of
its firms in the Balkans makes that the Greek - Turkish cooperation will be
welcome to stabilize the region.
THE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH GREECE
The Greek - Turkish relations know, since the seism in August 1999, a very
pure thaw. The rapprochement was in fact presumable in view of the marginalism
of the Greek ultra-nationalists as consequence to Ocalan affaire and in view of
a Turkish nominee at the European Union. The ultra-nationalists who had wanted
to force the Prime minister Costas Similis and to impose Ocalan presence in
Greece have caused a national crisis and were discredited causing to run the
risk of a war with Turkey after capture of PKK chief, and his going out from the
residence of the Greek ambassador in Nairobi (in February 1999). Theodore
Pangalos, minister of Foreign Affairs who took part in this fool's bargain,
demised and he was replaced by the minister of the European Affairs, Yorgos
Papandréou. The Turkish government has not received Greece international
condemnation for "the complicity with the terrorist" that it required.
However, the tension persisted, disturbing Athens for its security and Ankara
for its nominee at the European Union.
The gravity and the complexity of the documents in game let skeptical as to permanence
of this rapprochement. The political desire has missed up to there to solve the
problems opposing the two States. The bilateral contentions are not an
insurmountable obstacle. The questions of delimitation of the Aegean continental
plateau, the territorial waters, the air spaces and of the control of the air
traffic, the sovereignty on the islands and on the rocks, or of the
demilitarization of some Greek islands reveal first of all of the international
law (namely the conventions on the Right of the sea from 1958 and from 1982) and
contracts (contract and agreement of Lausanne from 1923, the convention of
Montreux from 1936, contract of Paris from 1947) 32. Would it be still necessary
that Turkey accepts to resort to the arbitration of the international Justice
Court (IJC) that it refuses. EU poses however this petition as an indispensable
condition to Turkey adhesion. The Greek government should also persist in its
decision to not enlarge the boundary of the territorial waters to 12 marine
miles, extension considered as an occasion to war in Ankara, but which is made
possible by the Convention on the Right of the sea from 1982 which Greece
ratified in 1995. The Greek government can force to accept to the public opinion
a IJC arbitration on all these questions, but not concessions given in direct
negotiations. The foreign Turkish policy is perceived by the government and the
Greek public opinion as policy of hegemonic power to which Greece can not
resist. The two Aegeus serious crises, this of March 1987 and that of
Imia in January 1996, show that the risk of an armed conflict is not completely
removed.
Nevertheless, the Cypriote problem is the most serious which opposes the Greeks
and the Turks. The official Turkish speech that the partition has solved the
Cypriote problem. However, since 1974, far from tasting in "paradise
corner" that the northern zone would according to the authority
propagation, the Turkish Cypriotes emigrate massively (33). The
initiatives for the benefit of the reconciliation and of the reunification are
multiplied inside " of the civil society" from one hand and from the
other lines of demarcation, but the Turkish Cypriotes authorities remain deaf
34. As to the Cypriot Greek government, it accumulates error in decision which
provoke new crises and arouse mistrust among the turkish Cypriot, while
their purpose is make pressure on Turkey that it accepted UNO solutions: the
authorization of demonstrating nationalist motorcyclists along a line of
demarcation in August 1996; the purchase of the Russian missiles soil- air S-300
in January 1997. The manifestation had to keep the attention of international
public opinion on Cyprus. The missiles should protect the south zone of a
Turkish air attack. In the first case, the Turkish ultra-nationalists ("
the Grey Wolves "), relied by Turkish security forces, have objected
killing two Greek Cypriotes. In the second case, the Turkish army threatened to
bombard the ramps of missiles, recovering the fear of the Turkish Cypriotes to
be cached between two fires. Ceding to the international pressures, the
government of Cyprus republic has accepted the missiles to be installed in Crete
(in December 1998).
The Turkish and Greek governments have to make efforts if they want sincerely to
put an end to this situation of cold war. The Cypriot problem is obviously at a
deadlock - the official negotiations leaded by UNO since 1975 never resulted.
Only one islands reunification, that the modalities remain to imagine, it seems
capable to seal a durable reconciliation between the Greeks and the Turks and to
disqualify two nationalism which nourish one from another.
The EU became, that it wanted or not, a leading actor in the turkish-Greek
conflict. The economic policy of Greece, future member of the Euro zone, is
under observation. It is obvious that the military excessive costs handicap it
and that it will be necessary to reduce them. The Cyprus republic can not almost
hope to see its adhesion accepted, until the conflict is not resolved, despite
all the declarations of the political European chiefs. Mainly, the process of
Turkey adhesion constitutes the same amount of stages of a radical modification
of the dimension of the Greek - Turkish relations . The adhesion to the EU has
completely another range that the NATO one, powerful but strictly interstate
union. Greece and Turkey was allied before their synchronous entrance in the
Organization (1952) and it remained powerless when the two countries confronted,
by nationalists interposed, to Cyprus, since 1955. The adhesion to the EU means
an integration in different spheres (political, economic, and social) which goes
further from the classical agreement between the States. Turkey should settle
the conflicts with Greece and the Cypriot problem before to adjoin but this
adhesion would conduct more than a simple rapprochement between the governments.
The Greek and Turkish economies, already more connected that before by the
custom union EU- TURKEY since 1996, will have the same currency and will be
subjected to the same requests (as indebtedness and inflation concern, etc.) '
At a political level, the government could not more have an appointment more
frequently synonymous to rivalry but which will be closely inserted in
complicated game of negotiations, of the compromises and of consensus research
which characterize the relations between the member States of the EU and which
is not after all that the projection of the rules of democratic internal
discussion on the interstate scene. The quarrels about the sovereignty by the
Aegean Sea appear since then exceeded.
The major problem of various attempts of rapprochement, namely since the famous
meeting in Davos (Switzerland) between the Prime ministers Turgut Ozal and
Andreas Papandreou (on the 30th and the 31-st of January 1988) and the process
which resulted, that they are not based on anything except the desire of the
high level governors. These undertake a " political impact ", bet on
the personal charisma, but the support of the opinion public, of the diplomacy
and of the militaries are absent to one or in the another of these chiefs, even
to the both simultaneously.
Calling vivacious criticizes from the Greek public and from the both sides of
the diplomacy and of the turkish army, Davos process, Turgut Ozal initiative, is
dragged on and the negative decision (from the 18th of December 1989) of the
european Commission concerning the turkish nominee has referred him a
death-blow. The negotiations carried at the level of ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Hikmet Cetin and Michalis Papaconstantinou, under the initiative of the
last one this time (1992-93), were postponed after Andreas Papandreou returning
to the authority (in October 1993). The "dialogue" - according to an
official nomenclature - issued in April 1997 had no more successes. One year
after Imia crisis, Costas Simitis and Theodore Pangalos hoped that the turkish
nominee to the adhesion to the EU, the nearest opening of the negotiations of
Cyprus republic adhesion and the pressure of other members States and of the
european Commission would conduct the turkish government to accept IJC petition.
It was the new dialogue of deaf persons, placing each one on their traditional
positions. The decision of the summit of Luxembourg not to write Turkey on the
candidate list to be adhered has called a cooling of the bilateral relations:
the turkish government simulated then to abandon any hope to adjoin one day to
the EU and not to consider more as primary a rapprochement with Greece.
The actual rapprochement owes much to the desire of the two ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Ismail Cem and Yorgos Papandreou. The ministers already conversed
during the Euro-Mediterranean summit in Stuttgart on the 16th of April 1999, or
two months after Ocalan crisis. The meeting following, the 30-th of June, during
a convention on Kosovo future in the United Nations Organization in New York,
was defining. Five bilateral conventions on the tourism, trade and terrorism are
established for July. They prepare the signing of four bilateral agreements, on
the judicial cooperation, tourism, trade and the end of the double taxation of
the investments. It occurs the earthquake in Turkey, which gives the occasion to
the Greek government to prove its conscientiousness to its Turkish colleague.
But the public opinion played a significant role: Being mobilized for the
benefit of Turkey help, the Greek public opinion signifies to its government
that it is not hostile to Turks - criticism of the Greek on the street aims
however mainly turkish government and army, but the is slightly racism towards
Turks in general. And the turkish public opinion thanks for this Greek help,
that which is a method to open the door to the rapprochement while Greece was
appointed to a popular vindictive for the partnership with " the chief
terrorist " Ocalan. Mainly, the cooperation between the not governmental
organizations, very promising after the Imia crisis from 1996 but interrupted by
the affair Ocalan, then was reinstated. From January 19 until January 22, 2000,
Yorgos Papandreou made an official visit without incident in Turkey, signing
four contracts of cooperation negotiated within July. In addition, Ismail Cem
went to Athens on the following 3-rd of February. Everything is not however
settled: the contentions were not still considered. In October 2000, the Greek
army quitted NATO maneuvers Destined Glory for which it cooperated with
Turkish army, because of the persistence of the dispute on the status
(demilitarized or not) of Lemnos island ...
TURKEY IN THE BASIN OF THE BLACK SEA AND IN THE BALKANS
However, the Greek-turkish agreement can only benefit of the stability and
of the prosperity in Balkans and in the basin of the Black Sea. As to stability,
the position is obvious enough. A common vision on the future of the region can
only dissuade new adventurism. It is not by hazard if Slobodan Milosevic managed
Greece during the Yugoslavian wars (1991-1999) while the Serbs theoretical
nationalists could have reminded that the Serb king Dusan dominated above all
present Greece in 14th century, that could open a way to the irredentism
requests as in Croatia or in Bosnia - Herzegovina, in Macedonia and in the other
place. The southern side of NATO disconnected, is all the preventive system of
the conflicts of the Union that appears weakened. It is necessary to mark that,
despite the public opinion hostile to the war leaded by NATO, the Greek
government has supported this war and contributed to the encirclement of
Yugoslavia. The two armies, Greek and turkish, which begin an armaments drive as
vain as expensive, representing, united, a power of fire capable to dissuade
everyone from the region to try to change the actual state of things. The two
armies have taken part to the multinational interference "Alba" in
Albania in spring 1997 (800 soldiers each one). They also are present inside a
multinational force under NATO direction in Kosovo .
As to the prosperity, Turkey invested in the economic Cooperation of the Black
Sea (Black Sea Economy Cooperation - BSEC), extended to Greece and to Albania.
They speak about a Turkish initiative. The BSEC foundation act is the
declaration of Istanbul from the 25th of June 1992. It poses as political
reference cadre the final Act of Helsinki and OSCE principles . The domains of
cooperation considered do not limit to the economy (transport and communication,
trade, tourism, agriculture, protection of the investments) even indirectly
(science and technology, sanitary and veterinary problem) but there is also a
problem of the environment protection (point 15) and more generally to make the
Black sea a " peace sea, stable and prosperous" (point 8). The signing
states - they are eleven: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia,
Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey. Apparently menaced by the
conflicts (namely Armenian-Azerbaijan) between its members, BSEC however
advanced and amplified gradually but surely. It was mainly institutionalized
(meetings of ministers of Foreign Affairs, constant secretary and parliamentary
assembly established in Istanbul, Bank of development and trade of the Black sea
in Salonika, international Center of Study on the Black sea, BSEC Business
Council), that is really more than simple forum, even if they are still far from
a real " common market ".
On the financial plan, Turkey and Greece are the unique States really to lift
funds for the projects of regional span. The financial contributions to the BSEC
establishments are significant: Greece, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine assure each
16 % of the secretary budgets. The capital of the Bank is distributed by a
following method: 16,5 % each one for Greece, Russia and Turkey; 13,5 % each for
Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine; 2 % each for other States.
The BSEC seem have to develop due to the Greek - turkish couple rather than to
the Russian - turkish couple which accumulates the contention subjects, namely
in Caucus with the war in Karabagh (Moscow supporting Armenia and Ankara
Azerbaijan) and in Chechnya (1,2 million Chechens live in Chechnya but 1,5
million turkish citizens are of Chechen origin). Even if the Turkish managers
multiply the successes on the Russian market, the prolongation of the war in
Chechnya does not allow any improving of the bilateral relations. The see bad,
already, the president Poutine to realize a official visit in Turkey without
incident. In addition, they also see bad a government in which MHP has its
residence to send such an invitation while this party is on the edge of pan-Turkish
speech.
Another subject of rivalry with Russia is the problem of delivery,
hereafter, of gas and petroleum of the Caspian Sea to west. There, Russia
intends to maintain the control of gas conduits and oil pipelines. Those
that exist pass all by Russia. Turkey supported by USA has offered to the
turkish-speaker States (Azerbaijan, Turkmen and Kazakhstan) to export their
hydrocarbon to west through Turkey. After years of study of the validity, of
conjectures on the Caucus future, wars in Georgia, in Karabagh, instability
in Bakou, the presidents of Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have
signed on the 18th of November 1999 a series of agreements for the
construction of an oil pipeline of 1730 kilometers, from Bakou to the
turkish petroleum terminal from Ceyhan, on the Mediterranean sea. The oil
pipeline would bend Armenia through Georgia. Besides another oil pipeline
connects, from April 1999, Bakou to the Georgian port Supsa, whence the
petroleum is loaded to Bosphorus. This solution does not suit Turkish
authorities that try also to reduce the passage of dangerous products in
Bosphorus, several fires onboard tankers having suffered a defeat conversion
as a catastrophe for Istanbul these last years. Another project is to
deliver petroleum from Bakou to Ceyhan through Iran. But this solution is
unpleasant for the USA and the American petroleum companies will be then
outside of game as it is forbidden to invest more than 40 millions dollars
in Iran. So, until now, the Russian projects seem less expensive, have
received Turkmen support and the work has already begun. The Russians base
their projects to an existing web, up to Novorossiisk port on the Black Sea.
There, they propose an underwater gas conduit to Turkey to resist to this
specific request. The petroleum, is delivered to Constance in Romania, or to
Burgas in Bulgaria whence an oil pipeline would transport to the Greek port
Alexandroupolis permitting to bend Bosphorus. The negotiations between the
different States and private companies thus are intense but Turkey has some
difficulties to mobilize the turkish-speaker States of central Asia however
presented in 1991-1993 as natural allies which returned after the USSR
disappearance
Turkey hopes for the central Asia will be rather disappointed. The
linguistic proximity does not turn inevitably to political rapprochement,
even if it can help. So, if the Azeris and Turkmen are very close to the
Turks from Turkey, the Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazakh have not so much in common.
Besides central Asia was found more under Persian and Russian influence and
then Turkish - ottoman these three last centuries. The turkish-speaker
remains well limited. Certainly, a state has send to the central Asia
teachers and manuals. Moreover, the brotherhood of nurcu dependence
managed by Fethullah Gtilen has opened schools and universities, under the
half-approbation, half - suspicious sight of the Turkish State, which has
not the habit to encourage, thus private enterprise aims with
religious movement! But the linguistic unification has not really taken
place: in Turkmenistan, the Cyrillic alphabet predominates always;
Uzbekistan the transcription of the language in the Latin alphabet has not
taken the letters specifically Turkish which the lecturer finds out here.
The Russian continues to predominate, as Russians, as the citizens of these
republics however, continue to occupy a lot of important post in the
responsibility.
The commercial success is indisputable for the Turkish businessmen, though
they are in a competitiveness with the Americans, the Chinese, the Russians
and Canadians - these last are the main investors in Kirghiztan. On the
political plan, it is completely another thing. The diplomatic Turkish
offensive in Caucus has made long fire, especially after the chute of the
Azerbaijan president Elçibey (1992-1993) and the replacement by Heydar who
is more pro-Russian. In central Asia, the Russian influence remains
forceful, namely in Uzbekistan where it has amplified in view of a guerilla
"Islamic" threat acting beginning with Tadjikistans. In
Turkmenistan, the Turkish, Russian and Iranian influences are in a
competitiveness. The tourney of the president Süleyman Demirel in the
region on February 1998 does not change the order: the central Asia
states need heavy investments, in particular as the infrastructures concern.
So Turkey has no the financial capacity to do it. Russia played, it, on the
security aspect and has at one's disposal still of enough credibility
"to offer" its "protection" to the States and mainly to
the autocratic regimes which dominate in the region. Iran tries equally to
earn in influence. But its policy is not in correspondence with that of
Turkey.
THE RELATIONS with IRAN AND TURKEY 'S PLACE In THE MIDDLE EAST
The Turkish - Iranian relations almost do not know any development other
than commercial. In July 1996, the agreement of the Iranian gas delivery to
Turkey was certainly signed. The Prime minister was then Necmettin Erbakan
and some observers considered to see the signing of a rapprochement even a
beginning of realization of a "Islamic common market " projected
by Refah Partisi. It was also for the visit of the Iranian president
Rafsandjani in December 1996. However, the connections of some most radical
currents of the political Islam with Iran have allowed to the Turkish
militaries to incriminate Refah Partisi. The recalling of the general Iran
consul in Erzurum in February 1997 has coincided with the ultimatum
addressed to Necmettin Erbakan and which brought the chute of the government
five months later.
Iran is still accused of supporting PKK, which guerillas took refuge also in
the Iranian Kurdistan, and which chief lives in Syria - or the best ally of
Iran in the Near East - until October 1998. The Turkish accusations nourish
and supply those formulated by the USA against Iran. However Turkey and Iran
are neighbors and none of them seems to want to infringe the status quo,
which dates from the 18- th century... Their respective models serve
essentially as to act as a foil to another, as illustrates the affair
Merve Kavakçî (35): Turkey as a western State and oppressor of the
religion and of the faithful, the symbol of decline of the Islamic valors,
the ally of the USA which is more, according to the Iranian regime; Iran as
a symbol obscurantism which the Islamic promised to Turkey if the army was
not there to protect Ataturk inheritance, according to kemalist.
Turkey finds itself hardly implied in the Israeli-Arabian conflict, in
particular after the amplification of its cooperation (mainly military) with
Israel, and owing to the relations with Syria. These last are in conflict,
in particular on the two documents, Sandjak Alexandrette question became
Turkish province from Hatay and the questions of division of Euphrates
waters, and this last connected with the Kurdish problem. The Syrian
government does not recognize thus Sandjak Alexandrette concession
(Iskenderun in Turkish) by France in Turkey, sine the time of the mandate
(1939). Until now, Sandjak figures on the Syrian maps as being a part of the
country.
The second problem is that of water. Euphrates takes its source in Turkey
before to water Syria and Iraq. In 1976, Syria inaugurated a barrage and
lake of retention Assad, located at a 60 kilometers from the Turkish
boundary, on the Euphrates. This barrage has for as objective not only the
hydroelectric production and also the irrigation of deserted grounds. They
say to regulate Euphrates debit that involves however the first
conflict with Iraq, which accuses Syria to reduce the debit of the
river in its profit. In Parallel Turkey issues, its own project of
construction not only from one but from a series of barrages (GAP).
The Syrian government requires, during all the 1990 decade, that Turkey
respects Turgut Ozal obligation who, during the visit in Syria (15-17-th of
July 1987), has signed a temporary protocol ensuring Syria of an Euphrates debit
of 500 cubic meters of water per one second. According to the Syrian
government, the debit is on the contrary more frequently 300
m3/second, that the turkish government recognizes partially attributing
however this difference to the drought, and not, as the Syrians affirm, to a
measure of retaliation for support given to the PKK.
Hafez Al-Assad government always denied support PKK and to protect Abdullah
Ocalan, at least before the crisis from October 1998. The Turkish political
and military chiefs launched then cautions very precise to Syria concerning
PKK. The 1-st of October, the military maneuvers of large span have begun
along the Syrian boundary. The threat was taken very seriously in Damascus.
The Egyptian president Hosni Moubarak and the Iranian minister the Foreign
Affairs have then undertaken a mediation who managed, the 9-th of October to
the insurance given by the Syrian government that he will take measures
against PKK, the 12 by the departure of Ocalan from Damascus to Moscow and
the 20 by the signature of the bilateral agreement of struggle against
terrorism and against PKK in particular. The victory of the Turkish
government would have been completed if Hafez Al-Assad has delivered
Abdullah Ocalan, but this would have constituted a bigger humiliation for
the Syrian president. The text of the agreement is already humiliating
enough in itself: Syria engages to take series of measures against PKK
(recognizing the quality of PKK "terrorist organizations", closing
of the camps of coaching, the insurance that Ocalan is not more there and
can not return, etc.) which sound as some recognition in relation to "
the status" of a terrorist State given to Syria by the USA. Turkey does
not offer any indemnification, all the obligations contained in the
agreement concern only Syria. Turkey has slightly weakened its neighbor,
which also that of Israel. So, precisely, if Hafez Al-Assad have maybe taken
the threat very seriously and reacted faulty, the connections between Ankara
and Tel Aviv do not value anything.
The cooperation with Israel is explained by technological necessity (as arms
concern) but mainly by complex environment of the Turkish leaders in the
middle of the1990 years. Semih Vaner sums up thus the concept, which they
have from the turkish leader threats:
" Turkey is subjected also to very force regional pressure, direct or
indirect, from the side of the authoritarian regimes (in particular Syria
and Iran) or from the side of the countries (in particular Greece and
Armenia) benefiting of the protection of States or of the western societies.
" (36)
The threat comes from the four of eight neighbors. Azerbaijan (11 kilometers
of frontier with Turkey thanking to Nakhitchevan) is an ally of Turkey.
Bulgaria and Georgia practice an equilibrated foreign policy, in particular
between Russia and Turkey. Iraq is not in any way capable to threaten Turkey
now.
The threat comes from the " authoritarian regimes", that is a
method to remind that Turkey is the unique democracy in the Near East, with
Israel certainly. The threat comes also from "the part of countries
benefiting of the States protection or western societies", which are
not authoritarian (whence the problem for Turkey to attract the support of
other democratic States against them) but which profit of condescension of
these democracies to support the "terrorism". We mark the
precision on the companies which refer to the idea of a support obtained
thanking to the Armenian and Greek lobbies, mainly in the USA. There would
be encirclement. For Eukru Elekdafi, it is obvious: Greece threatens Turkey
as in the Aegean sea as in Cyprus. Mainly, Greece would have signed with
Syria an agreement of cooperation in the problem of safety in June 1995,
certainly turned against Turkey (37).
Turkey wants to infringe encirclement partially due to the "
authoritarian regimes " which are also enemies of Israel partially due
to the States accused to support "terrorism" from which suffers
also Israel. Two democracies menaced by "terrorism", USA allied,
which cooperate. Is there anything that the Washington chiefs can not like?
Turkey was one of the first States to recognize Israel in 1949, but it
conducts, during the next decades, a prudent and multilateral policy in the
Israeli- Arabian conflict. The alliance with Israel date after the cold war
and after the war in Gulf. The turkish party, is the rise in power of the
PKK then of the political Islam which disturb the chiefs. There is on the
another hand the consciousness of force dependence as the arms concern in
relation to the USA that the embargo from 1975 - which responsible will be
the " Greek lobby" in the Congress - was perfectly illustrated.
Therefore, as the arms concern, the turkish militaries want to manage to
profit of the technology transfers that, even in case of a new American
embargo, will not force them to lose the armaments drive.
In exchange, the turkish army is powerful enough to dissuade any Arabian
State (even Iran) to attack Israel, even in case where the USA could not
interfere. So the war in Gulf has shown a relative vulnerability of Israel
to whom the American government has asked to not reply to the Iraq missiles
attacks in order not to complicate the position provoking, for example, the
defect of one or more Arabian members of the coalition against Iraq, in
particular Syria even Egypt. Certainly the turkish State had intense debates
inside it, between the president Ozal, the government and the headquarters,
involving a series of resignation, about the engagement on the USA part - at
least logistics as turkish armies have not taken part to the coalition. It
does not remain less than a union with Turkey has a dissuading important
effect that Israel would have nuclear weapon, principally in relation to
Syria, which finds itself taken between its two enemies which become
friends.
We shall not go into the details of Israeli-Turkish cooperation, begun
officially in March 1996. At this date a trade agreement is signed. The
following month, an agreement of military cooperation is concluded. Another
two military agreements are concluded the same year. They concern on
modalities of joint coaching for the aircraft and the possibility for the
Israelis to practice in the turkish air space, the modernization of the
turkish hunting planes F-4 by the Israeli arms industry, the sale of Israeli
Popeye missiles and the military joint air and marine maneuvers (these last
with the USA) (38).
Till now, the direct impact of this cooperation on the relations of Turkey
with its neighbors was rather limited to the business of the Russian
missiles S-300 that Cyprus Republic has purchased in January 1997 but which
were finally developed in Greece on a joint decision at the end of December
1998, and maybe to the affair Ocatan. In the first case, really, in June
1998, the turkish hunting planes F-16 have taken part in coaching in the
Israeli Neguev desert consisting to destroy batteries of missiles similar to
S-30039. Turkey has shown its determination to react in case of installing
missiles in Cyprus, at this with the Israel support, that which made without
any doubt a forceful signal in relation to the governments of the Cyprus and
Greece republics . On one hand, the Israeli secret services (Mossad) are
vastly suspected of having helped Turkish secret services to seize Abdullah
Ocalan in Kenya in February 1999 (40). The observers underline that the
turkish services had no any experience in this type of operation, but the
Mossad is a very large one, since, particularly, Eichmann kidnapping in
Argentina. Besides Kenya is considered as one of Mossad bases in east
Africa. The turkish State thus seems to benefit from the solidarity of
another Sata it also "terrorism" victim. (41)
Turkey seems thus today confronted to huge challenges both very important
being connected as they speak about the internal social-economical-political
development and of its adhesion to the european Union. Nevertheless, the
appeasement of the tensions with the closest neighbors is not at all a
simple problem to decide. The party of these tensions result from a not -
settlement of a Kurdish problem, which is not assigned only to Turkey.
Another tensions, in particular with Russia and Iran, have deep historical
roots and mark from policies of very classic power lead by the three
governments. At last, the becoming of the Israeli - Palestinian
conflict will necessarily have repercussions on the place that Turkey
occupies in the Near East .