George W. BUSH
A New Foreign Policy for a New President ?

By : Steven R. EKOVICH
Department of Politics and International Affairs
The American University of Paris



Now that the United States has a new president will it have a new foreign policy? Curiously enough this question is more frequently asked outside of the United States than by Americans themselves. During a presidential election the issue of foreign policy is rarely a priority in an American's choice among the candidates. More important factors are economic issues, party affiliation, social, ethnic and religious attachments, and the perceived competence and character of the candidates, or at least how these are communicated by the mass media. The last election was no different. Polls showed that foreign policy was near the bottom of the list of reasons that Americans chose one candidate over the others. Nevertheless, as in all presidential elections the candidates this time did sketch out their prospective foreign policies. We find these sketches in campaign speeches devoted exclusively to foreign and defense policy, to positions taken in the televised presidential debates (with usually one of the debates devoted to foreign policy), in the platforms of the parties adopted at their national nominating conventions, in the responses given to journalists' questions about foreign policy, and in the writings and declarations of the candidates' closest advisors. Immediately after the election another source of information are the ideas presented during confirmation hearings in the Senate of those individuals nominated by the new president to the posts of Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Based on the foregoing sources we can already begin to see what George W. Bush's foreign policy will look like. We can help bring the picture into focus by contrasting it with the foreign policy proposals made by Al Gore and his team.

But to begin with, it is important to see what the candidates of the two major parties share in their views of the role of the United States in the world. There is, first and foremost, a shared "liberal" ideology, in the European sense of "liberal." This ideology serves as the bedrock of the American consensus and is, therefore, rarely called into question. All the positions taken by the candidates also come up against well-entrenched institutional and bureaucratic obstacles. Ideology and institutions, as well as economic and strategic interests, of course, help assure an essential continuity in foreign policy. So, the candidates of both major parties this time were internationalists, supporters of open markets and globalization, as well as advocates of a robust and unrivalled military.

This is not to say that the candidates proposed the same foreign policy. But we should wonder to what extent a change in president, even from the opposition party, as well as a change in the party composition of the Congress, leads to changes in foreign policy. This is not to suggest that changes will be minimal, only that the system imposes limits. This having been said, it is at the moment of a presidential election that American citizens have the most direct influence on the general orientation of their country's foreign policy. Between elections other institutions link more disparate preferences to government policy. Among these other linking institutions we find interest groups (often abusively characterized as "lobbies" in France), journalists and the media, universities and think tanks, public opinion through frequent polls, and, of course, the government bureaucracy. A new president is called upon immediately to devote a certain effort to getting control of the government bureaucracy - and in the case of foreign policy all the centers of power throughout government that have something to do in its formulation and execution. New presidents succeed or fail in this to different degrees.

It must not be forgotten that in the realm of foreign policy the American Founding Fathers gave to the Congress, especially the Senate, significant powers to share with the president. It should be recalled, for example, that the Constitution requires all treaties to be ratified by a majority of two-thirds in the Senate. But the Senate is divided, not only between the two major parties (and this time 50-50!), but also by numerous committees, many of whom have something to say about foreign policy. The real power of Congressional committees in the United States is often not fully recognized by the French. The Congress has also created its own vast bureaucracy, precisely to confront better the executive branch of government. The history of American foreign policy has often seen powerful Senators playing a decisive role.

But back to the campaign trail. George W. Bush presented his conception of America's relations with the world in two major speeches. The first was devoted to defense policy and was delivered at the Citadel, a renowned military academy in South Carolina. The other was centered exclusively on foreign policy and was delivered at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in California. In this speech Bush characterized his foreign policy as "A Distinctly American Internationalism." After the speech he was asked during the campaign what exactly he meant by this. The question remains open. Let's try to answer it.

"In the defense of our nation," declared Bush, "a president must be a clear-eyed realist." This must sound obvious to French ears, but in the United States this declaration is part of a very old debate which has pitted "realists" against "idealists." This debate may be summed up with the question: "Should American power be used only to promote American interests, or may it also be used to defend and promote American values?" Every president has been required to come to grips publicly with this question. During the 1992 campaign, for example, Bill Clinton presented his proposed foreign policy as one of "democratic realism" or "Wilsonian realism" (because President Woodrow Wilson has been viewed as something of a idealistic zealot, especially due to the passion he put into the creation of the League of Nations). It is not surprising, then, to hear George W. Bush place heavy emphasis to the "realist" side of the debate. Even though the Republican Party has traditionally adopted such a stance, today's party also embraces an "idealist" wing, often associated with former President Reagan. A third current, isolationism, is also sometimes found among Republicans, including its members in the Congress. However, isolationism is largely viewed by realists as impossible in today's interdependent world and the theme of isolationism is relegated to rhetoric rather than policy. So President Bush cannot abandon an appeal to American ideals. "Some have tried to pose a choice between American ideals and American interests -- between who we are and how we act," he says. "But the choice is false," he continues. "A distinctly American internationalism" must be " idealism without illusions" and "realism in the service of American ideals."

But what are these ideals? In the past American ideals have referred to democratic ideals. However, George W. Bush seems to have redefined them, at least slightly. In his terms they have become ideals of the "human spirit," so that he may celebrate their defense by such diverse figures as Scharansky, Havel, Walesa and Mandela. "The most powerful force in the world is not a weapon or a nation but a truth: that we are spiritual beings, and that freedom is 'the soul's right to breath.'" Another of these ideals made explicit by Bush is the right of people to worship as they wish. A new direction in American foreign policy or simply a soothing incantation to the religious right wing of the Republican Party? Bush himself tempers his words by adding that "We propose our principles, we must not impose our culture." But to what extent is this respected when one of his first actions as president is to sign an executive order prohibiting American funding of international organizations that advocate and facilitate abortion?

At this point we might better understand Bush by comparing what Al Gore had to say about American idealism. In Gore's speech on foreign policy (delivered at the Old South Meeting House in Boston where, according to the candidate, "the seeds of American liberty were first planted"), he classified foreign policy issues into two categories. The first are "classic security threats" which touch on American safety and interests. Gore and Bush share the same basic approach to this category of threats, central to the concerns of realists. However, Gore identified another category of "new security challenges" which require a "new security agenda for the Global Age." The new agenda goes beyond the usual post-Cold War list of threats such as terrorism, proliferation of arms of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts, the international drug trade, and assistance to countries making democratic transitions, to include: new pandemics such as AIDS, poverty, destabilizing population growth, and the disruption of the world's ecological systems. The Bush team manifested a certain skepticism in placing so many of these other problems within the scope of national security policy.

 Furthermore, for Gore the new security challenges require reinvigorated international and regional institutions. This is all the more important for Gore because he sees the traditional nation-state changing as "power moves upwards and downwards, to everything from supra-national organizations and coalitions all the way down to feuding clans." The Bush team, on the contrary, views the international system as an arena of contest primarily between nation-states (albeit where some have much more power than others), and where international organizations serve their interests. Gore also proposed a doctrine he called "forward engagement" - addressing problems early in their development before they become crises; addressing them as close to the source of the problem as possible; and having forces and resources to deal with those threats as soon after their emergence as possible. The Bush team would no doubt not disagree with such a doctrine; only apply it differently in different circumstances. If problems in their early development do not appear to have any plausible direct relationship to American interests, President Bush would less likely employ American power. As one New York journalist quipped, this would include an armed attack on the State of Ohio, because an attack on New York would not be serious enough. All this means that for the Bush team an American intervention in humanitarian missions or crises involving human rights' abuses would likely not see the deployment of U.S. military forces.

 During the election campaign this difference of views opened a debate on what came to be called "nation building." Should the military play a role in rebuilding stable institutions, and preferably democratic ones, after their collapse due to civil conflict? The cases in mind were Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and Somalia. Another way of putting the question was should the American military be given missions that would degrade its ability to fight and win battles, especially "high intensity" battles? The Congress has joined in this debate. How can the military tool be used for "soft" missions such as peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and humanitarian relief? If the military limits itself to "high-intensity" battles would the United States no longer be able to employ effectively its armed forces in a more subtle fashion in the pursuit of diplomatic solutions? Would softer missions and the more graduated use of military power in diplomacy be left to America's allies, leaving the to U.S. army only those mission where it is necessary to hit hard? What would this do the image of the United States in the world?

Beyond the general conceptions of American foreign policy presented during the campaign, what did George W. Bush have to say about U.S. relations in the various regions of the world? The New York Times admonished the candidate for limiting his concerns to the great powers of the world. The Bush team responded by saying that these were only priorities necessary to a focused foreign policy, not one that drifts as they claim Clinton's had done. The French, for example, may be surprised to find that there was practically no mention made of Africa. So, what then are Bush's priorities? As the President stated them, they are to "work with our strong democratic allies in Europe and Asia to extend the peace;" to "promote a fully democratic Western Hemisphere, bound together by free trade;" to "defend America's interests in the Persian Gulf and advance peace in the Middle East, based upon a secure Israel;" to "check the contagious spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them;" and, as we have already seen, to "lead towards a world that trades in freedom." Each point deserves closer examination.

 The country that seemed to attract the most attention in discussions of foreign policy was China. It must be pointed out that the United States is as concerned with its relations across the Pacific Ocean, its interests in Asia, as with its European relations. Bush has embraced one of the traditional American strategies toward China, the "Rim Strategy" which attempts to contain China. This helps to explain why he characterized China as a "strategic competitor" rather than a "strategic partner" (the Clinton/Gore formulation). For Clinton and Gore a strategic partnership implies a constructive economic engagement of China, in the hopes that it would lead to an economic liberalization that would bring in its wake a movement toward democratization and, therefore, a reduced threat to the United States. This is one reason why recent American policy has aimed at bringing China into the WTO before it "deserves" its membership. The Bush team is not against the economic liberalization of China, far from it. They are simply more circumspect when it comes to evaluating China's aims and actions. Thus, Bush's proposed China policy is coherent with his policy towards Cuba, which he also intends to continue to contain. It has not been easy, in particular for Gore, to explain why an economic engagement of China might lead to liberalization and not achieve the same for Cuba. Perhaps the votes of Cuban-Americans in Florida could help to explain the contradiction?

Of course any strategy that aims at China must also take into account Japan and India. The Bush team believes that Clinton did not give enough attention to U.S. relations with Japan, especially in a period of relative rapprochement with China. Bush's distancing from China could also make it easier for Japan to gain more independence in Asia, especially if U.S.-Japanese relations are reinvigorated. This could, however, also make the Chinese leadership more nervous. The same could be the result of additional political-military support to Taiwan. Both candidates announced immediate military support for Taiwan in case Beijing attempted to impose reunification by military means. This does not mean that Bush will abandon the current "One China" policy, only that it should be achieved peacefully through negotiations and with the accord of the Taiwanese. India might also be viewed at a counterweight to China. American circumspection vis-à-vis China could only appeal to the Indian leadership. But inclining more toward Indian views of China does not mean supporting Indian hegemony in South Asia and picking favorites in its conflict with Pakistan. In any case, recent declarations by the future Secretary of State Colin Powell seem to indicate that there will not be a drastic change from the preceding American policy toward China. American relations with North Korea, however, will no doubt be much tougher, at least to begin with.

Bush's pronouncements regarding U.S. relations with Europe dusted off the usual formulas of continuing friendship and shared values, interests and prosperity. He did promise, however, to devote more effort to dialogue and consultation with European allies, which he claimed would be an improvement over Bill Clinton's dealings with them. For the Bush team NATO remains the keystone of the United States' relations with Europe. Furthermore, for Colin Powell "NATO is not aimed at Russia; NATO is aimed at the peace of Europe. And Russia is European too, after all." It remains to be seen if the Russians can be convinced. Russia was another country that sustained foreign policy debate during the campaign. For the Bush team the Clinton policy toward Russia put too much at stake simply on good relations with Boris Yeltsin. It should be remembered that Bush's new National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, is a Russia specialist. She was also on the staff of the National Security Council in Bush Sr. White House where she had responsibilities for the German reunification dossier. Perhaps it should also be recalled that Bush Sr. reoriented Ronald Reagan's "privileged" relationship with Margaret Thatcher's U.K. towards one of a "Partner in Leadership" with Germany.

 The region of the world that was given the honor of being placed first in the foreign policy section of the Republican Party platform was Latin America. If there is one region of the world where George W. Bush can claim foreign policy expertise and experience it is here, especially with Mexico, the neighbor of Texas. The former governor, who speaks Spanish, has come to know Mexico's leaders. The Bush policy toward Latin American can be summarized as promoting open markets and democratization. As Colin Powell put it before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "the ultimate goal is free trade from the Yukon to Cape Horn." It should also be mentioned that the capital of Texas, Austin, is an important center of the high-tech information industry -- so Bush can credibly present himself as someone who has had direct practical experience with the requirements of the new economy.

During the campaign neither of the candidates said much about the Middle East beyond expressing the usual platitudes regarding the search for a comprehensive peace that would assure the security of Israel. Since delicate negotiations were underway, the candidates did not want to risk jeopardizing their success with public criticisms that could appear reckless. Both candidates needed to appear as responsible statesmen. The diplomatic situation also probably gave to each candidate a solid pretext for staying away from a topic that quickly leads into a political quagmire. Bush, like his predecessor, announced that as president he would move the American Embassy to Jerusalem, a position that could only appeal favorably to Jewish voters. However, like President Clinton, he did not say much about the timetable for such a move, which may very likely take place in a future more distant than near. On one Middle East subject, at least, Bush did not mince his words - Iraq. The Bush team considers the current policy toward Iraq as a complete failure and has let it be known that they would work to replace Saddam, try to get into place some kind of observer mission to limit the construction of arms of mass destruction, and if militarily provoked by the Iraqi regime will respond in a much more muscular fashion that Bill Clinton was inclined to do. It remains to be seen how much support the U.S. will get from its allies for such a riposte, or if it will act alone. The recent announcement by Colin Powell that the U.S. would review economic sanctions that have been placed on several countries will probably not include Iraq. On the contrary, lifting sanctions elsewhere may help Bush get the diplomatic support he would like in order to focus and tighten sanctions on Iraq, or to hit hard if necessary. It should not be overlooked that the Bush national security team is composed of several individuals who have had interests and long experience in the oil industry, including the President's family. It is therefore not likely that they will make moves in the Gulf that would cut off the flow of black gold or destabilize its market, especially in a period when there is talk of the American economy going into recession.

We come now to the disquieting problem of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Bush has come out against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would prohibit all nuclear tests. In the platform of the Republican Party the CTBT is characterized as an anachronism of obsolete strategic thinking. As a majority of the Senate concluded after its debate of the treaty, Bush also does not believe that it allows for adequate verification of compliance, that it will not allow the U.S. to evaluate the safety and reliability of the its nuclear force, and that it still will not prevent "rogue" states from acquiring nuclear weapons. It will be interesting to see what President Bush does about the treaty after analyzing the report, made public January 5, of retired General Shalikashvili (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The general's report agrees with the Senate that there are problems with the treaty, but that attaching understandings and making side agreements could overcome them. This is particularly crucial because the General affirms that the treaty is indispensable to the security of the United States.

 The CTBT did not, however, provoke as much debate as the proposed anti-missile defense system. Even though both candidates agreed in principle on its necessity, they disagreed on the method for going about putting it into place. Both agreed that a National Missile Defense (NMD) was needed to protect U.S. territory from missile attacks and that a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) of more limited range designed to protect American and allied troops deployed anywhere in the world was also on the agenda. There was far less debate about TMD, in fact it was practically absent from the debate, while differences emerged primarily over NMD. Few are against a system that would protect troops in the field, and since the TMD is more limited it would not neutralize the nuclear arsenal of Russia. For the Chinese, however, both NMD and TMD are capable of neutralizing their more limited arsenal, thus undermining the logic of deterrence between the U.S. and China. In order for the Chinese to re-establish the logic in such circumstances they could increase the number of their missiles and warheads to overwhelm the missile defense. But an increase in the Chinese arsenal could lead to a corresponding increase in the Indian arsenal, and perhaps also the Pakistani arsenal, and thus by a cascade effect provoke a renewed nuclear arms race, at least in the region. Nevertheless, the Bush team seems determined to go ahead with plans for NMD. They believe they can negotiate an agreement with Russia to proceed with the project, even though it would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as it now stands. If it remains difficult to persuade the Russians, how much more difficult will it be to assuage the Chinese?

 All political programs are general and largely theoretical, and it is no different for George W. Bush's proposed foreign policy. The crucial test of the program will come in its application by the new president and his national security team, widely recognized as experienced and knowledgeable, to the complexities and uncertainties of the world. Crises are, after all, grave events that have not usually been anticipated.