A Geostrategy for Global Peace

By Hall Gardner

<sup>The break down of the bipolar world has led to the rise of a new regional powers and political movements that have begun to wield new and varied forms of strategic leveraging in order to assert their essentially regional geopolitical interests against the boundaries generally framed by either the United States or the Soviet Union during the bipolar Cold War.
Soviet collapse, which not so accidentally followed German unification, has consequently resulted in new polycentric global system in which states possess highly uneven power capabilities, it has also opened up a new fissures of actually and potentially conflicting states that extend from the Baltic states and Finland to ex-Yugoslavia and then from the Caucasus deep into central Asia with Afghanistan at the gut. These fissures (that do not correspond neatly with Samuel Huntington's simplistic conception of a "fault line" of potentially "clashing civilizations") have accordingly spread to Turkey and traces of former Ottoman influence in the Caucasus and in Central Asia--and have become increasingly linked with the Middle East/Persian Gulf and then with the Asian littoral.

Moreover, while Moscow has fallen from "superpower status" (i.e. fallen its position as a global triphibious land, sea, air power to that of an essentially land-locked semiperipheral state), China has begun to rise politically, economically, and militarily as a more independent power, as Beijing now seeks to move from the status of a continental to a triphibious power in an effort to assert regional hegemony in Asia, and over Taiwan in particular. The rise of China has, in part, led Japan to expand its insular naval and high-tech military capabilities step-by-step in accord with a strengthening bilateral alliance with the United States, at the same time that Tokyo remains wary of Russian intentions. Soviet collapse, coupled with German unification, has largely augmented Japanese demands to regain the Kuril islands/northern territories taken by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Concurrently, one cannot overlook the fact China's rivalry with India and support for Pakistan has likewise influenced the latter's decision to go nuclear.

Ironically, the collapse of the Soviet Union has meant that much as the United States absorbed British and French spheres of security and influence in the aftermath of World War II, the United States is now engaged in absorbing former Soviet spheres of influence and security, as an aspect of a post-Cold War strategy of "double containment" in regard to both Germany and Russia (and involving a strategy of strategic denial in regard to the latter). The United States has also opted to intervene in regions that had largely been stable during the Cold War due to tacit or formal U.S-Soviet agreement (such as the formerly neutral ex-Yugoslavia before the latter became torn apart by separatist factions engaging in "ethnic cleansing"). Washington has accordingly found itself militarily engaged in new regions, not only at the risk of "imperial overstretch" to borrow Paul Kennedy's phrase, but also without first establishing the necessary mutual diplomatic accords with Russia, Europe, China, and Japan, as well as rising powers such as India, that are essential to the establishment of a new global equilibrium.

With the collapse of the former bipolar global order, the major and minor powers alike, with highly uneven political, economic and military capabilities, have been engaged in a new, yet risky, process of re-equilibriation, one that involves new alliance formations and new threats of "encirclement and "counter-encirclement." A potential new polarization of the world into two rival alliances appears to be in the making--if an alternative strategy for global peace cannot soon be implemented.

On the one side, the United States and NATO have opted to expand into central Europe, and have been considering a further enlargement, possibly to include the Baltic states. These actions have been taking place at roughly the same time that the United States has strengthened its bilateral alliance with Japan as means to counter any potential Russian "threat" from an instable Russia and potential Russian alliance with China and its burgeoning naval, nuclear, and military-technological capabilities. Moscow has likewise tended to regard American and NATO links with Turkey as a potential threat to its soft Turkic-Islamic underbelly. The United States has also sought the "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq, but at the same time, seeking to contain Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, indirectly by consequence, Russia.

On the other side, Moscow has sought to strengthen its bilateral alliance with Belarus, and has thus far unsuccessfully pressured Ukraine; it has also sought to strengthen relations with a rising China and India. While such an alliance between Russia, Belarus, China and India (and potentially Ukraine) appears problematic (largely due to continuing historical disputes between Ukraine and Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, China and Russia, China and India) such a grouping need not actually coordinate strategy to be in a position to attempt to stretch American and European military resources. This would be particularly true if Russia, China, and India either separately, or combined, continue to support the so-called "states of concern" (formerly dubbed "rogue states") such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya in counter action to U.S. policies.

The collapse of the bipolar world order has moreover set aflame a number of gueguerres (or regional wars of attrition) among both rising powers and lesser states and political movements. These regional conflicts had either been suppressed or else kept "limited" by the "superpowers" during the Cold War, but have been able to find new sources of fuelling since 1989/91. There is thus a danger that the dual push-pull relationship of major and minor power interaction in regional conflicts can ultimately draw in major powers onto opposing sides and into the formation of antagonistic alliances--if their surrounding regional fissures cannot ultimately be healed by a proactive and irenic diplomacy.

In effect, the post-Cold War period has become more dangerous than the Cold War period. Unlike the Cold War in which the Soviet Union played a role as an expanding triphibious power, the new Russia now represents an essentially land-locked power that jealously (and viciously in regard to Chechnya) has sought to safeguard its territorial integrity. Moreover, as the new post-Soviet Russia was not decisively defeated during the Cold War, the possibility of a highly instable yet revanchist Russia cannot be ruled out. The risk here is that, in historical terms, states that have been indecisively defeated by means of major power war may well be able to resurrect themselves--but only assuming that they cannot be positively reintegrated into a new international system, and thus, in the contemporary situation, that the new Russia can not soon be more thoroughly integrated into the new Euro-Atlantic community.

Ironically, however, wars of attrition can help to bring the major powers (i.e. the United States, European Union, and Russia, at a minimum, and possibly China in the future) to work in concert in order to seek the resolution of these conflicts, or at least attempt to limit the consequences of these conflicts once they begin to touch their national interests more directly. But this latter possibility of a concerted major power relationship assumes that the latter can find enough significant common interests--and common threats--in order to act in concert, and to engage in a common strategy for global peace most reminiscent of the early 18th, or mid-19th, century (post-Crimean war) "concerts of Europe. "

Post-Cold War: The Sound of One Hand Clapping
While the policy of United States was largely intended to achieve a Soviet withdrawal from eastern Europe, Washington did not expect (or welcome) the collapse of the Soviet Union into fifteen separate republics, in which at least four initially possessed significant nuclear capabilities (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus). It also did not expect the nightmare scenario of a spread of tactical nuclear weapons and most importantly technical know-how to "states of concern" or so-called "rogue states." Moreover, Russia itself appeared to splinter into numerous regional and ethno-political disputes, some of these continue to possess significant implications for regions bordering Russia.

At least initially, Washington and Moscow, found a common interest: Both opposed the spread of nuclear weapons to former Soviet states, and hence both worked in tandem to destroy the nuclear weapons remaining in these states or else return them back to Russia. Ironically, however, the fact that Russia was permitted to sustain its nuclear monopoly over the break-off republics of the former Soviet Union has helped Russia to re-assert its hegemony over those same newly independent states, if not indirectly, in more recent years, and to work to re-unify and eliminate centrifugal tendencies within the Russian Federation.

Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Kaliningrad
Having first worked overtly with Moscow to re-establish its hegemony over the former Soviet Union (and prevent Ukraine from sustaining a nuclear deterrent in accord with the 1994 U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian trilateral agreement), Washington then proceeded to enlarge its own security apparatus into former Soviet spheres of influence. Although the United States appeared to promise Mikhail Gorbachev that it would expand NATO "jurisdiction" into East Germany only, Washington nevertheless took steps to enlarge NATO into central Europe, and is presently in the process of considering a second wave of enlargement.
Moscow has additionally expressed fears that Kiev may be seeking an anti-Russian alliance with NATO-member Poland through their "strategic partnership," in addition to countering Russian interests in the Black sea region in cooperation with Turkey. Moscow has consequently opposed a "Baltic-Black sea alliance" and has used oil as one weapon in the effort to pressure Ukraine, as well as other states, such as Georgia, into following a pro-Russian policy and to assure that these states do not enter NATO.

  NATO enlargement, combined with Russian pressures, has consequently threatened to splinter Ukraine, which is presently rocked with calls for impeachment and charges of corruption upon the part of its President Leonid Kuchma, who has generally been regarded pro-Russian by nationalist factions. On the other hand, pro-Russian factions have sought closer cooperation with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. U.S. calls for National Ballistic Missile defenses, for example, have led to calls for closer military-technological cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, the general inability of Ukraine to reform its failing economy has jeopardized closer ties with the European Union and the United States. In many ways, maintaining Ukraine as a stable "buffer" between NATO and Russia is key to the new post-Cold War European equilibrium; yet both domestic and international factors seem to be working against the long-term establishment of an independent, neutral, and non-nuclear Ukraine. If push came to shove, Ukraine would shift more likely toward Moscow than toward NATO and the EU--if not break up with the potential for drawing in regional powers. It is accordingly up to the EU and the U.S. to work in concert to sustain Kiev's independent course without trying to destabilize it.

The Vilnius Nine
Once NATO opted to enlarge selectively into central Europe, states that were not permitted to enter on the first round have begun to clamor for entry on the second. The Vilnius Nine (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Macedonia and Albania) have all lobbied to enter NATO. These states have begun to agonize on the 'outside' as they appear frustrated that they might not ever get on the 'inside.' (Most have supporters, already inside NATO, who will back their membership in the Alliance).

Although tensions have, to a certain extent, been mitigated by the Partnership for Peace initiative, it is not clear that NATO (or the EU) will be able prevent a number of disputes from generating into new conflicts. Tensions between Hungary and Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, Poland and Belarus, Ukraine-Romania (based on historical territorial trade disputes, immigration and ethnic disputes, or irredentist claims) appear latent and could come to the forefront in the near future despite apparently sincere efforts of their present leaderships to mutually recognize one another's borders and to ameliorate tensions.
Not without their own internal tensions, the Baltic states fear that if they are not soon accepted into NATO that they may ultimately be forced back into the Russian camp. Romania fears that it may be forced to renationalize its defenses against NATO-member Hungary and Ukraine. Macedonia and Albania fear the possibility of continued instability and civil war in the aftermath of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Kaliningrad
As argued in my previous article in the first issue of Geostrategiques, of possible disputes in Europe that could suddenly and not-so-unexpectedly explode, the most salient is that of Kaliningrad which presently threatens a 1948 Berlin Crisis in reverse. Russia has thus far stomached NATO enlargement into Central Europe, as well as NATO's war "over" Kosovo, but it has consistently warned that the full integration of the Baltic states into NATO's command would represent a casus belli. Of particular concern from the Russian perspective is the fact that NATO and EU membership for the Baltic states could eliminate its right of transit through Lithuania and the other Baltic states (which are still to a large extent dependent upon Russian trade and oil) to Russian Kaliningrad, and thus close off its already limited access to the sea and the high tech western world.
Moreover, Moscow has view NATO activities as threatening even prior to a potential decision to enlarge NATO. The Chief of the Kaliningrad Air Defense District, Major General Fedor Krisanov, had previously stated in September 1999 that his agency has been concerned with NATO's activity near the Kaliningrad border, stating that there have been more than 560 combat and reconnaissance flights by foreign aircraft including Polish, German, Danish, Swedish and British planes approaching within 2-3 km of the Russian border.

Russia has consequently threatened to counter NATO enlargement by strengthening its ballistic and cruise missile capabilities in the Kola peninsula--and possibly--in Kaliningrad, at the evident risk of a new destabilizing arms race. Another threatened option would be to re-occupy the Baltic states as a preemptive counter to NATO-EU enlargement (as almost occurred in 1991). The purported deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad oblast was ostensibly detected as early as 1998 but only made public once the Bush administration began to take power in 2001. According to Russian sources, a recent inspection by Polish inspectors appeared to indicate that no nuclear weapons have been stored in the region. Russian spokespersons dismissed the allegations of tactical nuclear weapons deployment as disinformation designed to boost popular support for NATO enlargement and to obtain European support for a Ballistic Missile Defense system.

In January 2001, the Swedish presidency of the EU vowed to focus on the Baltic region and to engage in preventive diplomacy. A EU-Russian summit has been planned for the Spring. On the one hand, potential the threat of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad may push Europeans closer to American proposals (and contracts) to develop anti-ballistic missile defense technologies; on the other hand, the threat also implies the necessity to deal with the underlying geopolitical issues of Russian fears of Kaliningrad's isolation and possible secession. The issue raised here is that EU-Russian diplomatic accords to establish the long-term status of Kaliningrad and the Baltic region are not sufficient--NATO must also work closely with both.

Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia
Although Greek-Turkish tensions appeared to be winding down somewhat following "earthquake diplomacy," and the EU decision to accept the Turkish application for membership, Turkey had been confronted with a major financial crisis and political infighting between its pro-reformist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and its Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit. The issue of Cyprus remains a "hot spot" of contention between Greece (which has threatened to block EU enlargement if Cyprus does not enter) and Turkey. The issue threatens to postpone Turkish membership in the EU, following the break down of the December 2000 "proximity talks." On the one hand, its political-economic crisis could force Turkey to work closer with the EU; on the other hand, it could also send Turkey into neo-nationalism, if not pan-Turianism.

It is often overlooked that NATO-member Turkey has new found interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which may clash with those of Iran and Russia, among other regional powers, at the same time that Turkey holds the forward position in the continual gueguerre with Iraq. The latter war began to re-escalate following Baghdad's expulsion of UN weapons inspection teams in late 1998 and the subsequent Anglo-American bombing of military outposts in the no-fly zones. Turkey has also been at war (from at least 1984 until 1999) with Kurdish independence movements who have been regarded by Ankara as being supported by Syria, Iraq, Iran, and possibly Moscow.

Moscow has, for its part, claimed that a "Caucasus conspiracy" has been forming between NATO-member Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia against Russia, Iran, and Armenia; at the same time, it argues that the Taliban in Afghanistan, which it believes is backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, among other parties, have been lending support to the Chechen resistance. Moscow has believed that Turkey has been unofficially seeking to re-establish a Turkic Commonwealth, linking Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan; it also seeks to include Iran and Slavic Ukraine. American policy has likewise sought to sponsor GUUAM linking Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. This fact has led Russia to pressure and cajole these latter states into towing the Russian line.

Turkey, however, has claimed that its policies are intended to counter pan-Islamic movements and Uighur separatism that the "Shanghai Five" of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have been unable to contain. (In August 1999, the Shanghai Five pledged to cooperate in fighting terrorism, drugs, arms smuggling, illegal migration, national separation and religious extremism.) Turkey has also stated its intent to contain pan-Islamic movements stemming from the Afghan Taliban, Iran, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In this regard, NATO-member Turkey has signed a military cooperation agreements with Kyrgyzstan and the Uzbek leadership (which has thus far refused Russian supports against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which has launched incursions into Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan). In addition, Turkey has likewise signed an "anti-terrorist" agreement with Russia, and promised that Ankara would no longer provide wounded Chechen rebels with medical treatment.

Linked to efforts to forge new geopolitical alliances on the part of Moscow and Washington are the new proposed oil routes from the Caspian sea. In particular, Russia opposes the American backed Caspian oil-pipeline project from Baku to Ceylan in Turkey through Georgia. Recently Georgia, for example, has been pressured by Moscow to accept a status of "neutrality" (rather than join NATO). President Eduard Shevardnadze, who promised in 1999 elections that Georgia would join NATO by 2004, still hopes to sustain Georgia's role in the Partnership for Peace, however. From this perspective, by blocking alternatives to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the U.S. has inadvertently weakened states such as Georgia in the region that could benefit from alternative routes. Otherwise, these states could be forced to look back to Russia; concurrently, U.S. policy may be bringing Tehran and Moscow even closer together.

Moreover, the possibility of a clash between Turkey backing Azerbaijan and Russia backing Armenia, for example, remains latent despite the 1994 cease fire--as peace talks have remained deadlocked. (Both Turkey and Iran have attempted to broker the conflict.)

It has become increasingly clear that the Caucasus has been overrated as "vital" American security interest and that the so-called "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran really represents a quadruple, if not quintuple, containment of Afghanistan, and indirectly Russia plus Pakistan. The above issues will require the Bush administration to engage in a very profound negotiation process with both Russia and Iran.

The Middle East: Iraq and Israel
The Bush administration's first major foreign policy initiative literally started off with a blast following U.S.-UK bombing of Iraqi military installations in southern Baghdad outside the no-fly zones, a step-up from previous attacks (actions previously taken within the no-fly zones since late 1998 under President Clinton.) Air strikes were justified on the grounds that Saddam Hussein's new defense capabilities give Iraq the capability to shoot down U.S.-UK aircraft, and to keep its military in a state of total disrepair. Iraq is alleged to have built up new military capabilities, using the UN "oil for food" policy to buy weapons and gain assistance purportedly from Russia, China, Germany and North Korea, among others. The air attacks were timed, incidentally, to prevent strikes from hitting Chinese workers who have been helping to install underground fiber optics cables so as to improve Iraq's air defenses. (Having struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the war "over" Kosovo, Washington did not want to make the same mistake in Baghdad!)

These actions have taken place as Israeli-Palestinian conflict appears to be escalating, and while Israeli negotiations with Syria have been put on hold. Iraq has called for Arab states to unify to support the Palestinian intifada--in part in an effort to influence the forthcoming summit of the Arab League. Iraqi militancy also represents an effort to drive a further wedge between the new Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and PLO leader Yasser Arafat and gain popular Arab support.

Iraq, Iran, and Libya have been singled out by Washington as "states of concern" that may be acquiring weapons of mass destruction, at the same time that it has been presumed, but rarely publicly stated, that Israel possesses a significant atomic capability. In addition to the fact that the new administration of George Bush Jr. has a chip on its shoulder for the decision of his father (George Bush, Sr.) not to go to Baghdad and the father's inability to eliminate Saddam Hussein once and for all, an additional unspoken rationale for the new Bush administration's recent decision to target Iraq is also to prevent Israel from acting unilaterally. Israel had acted preemptively to bomb the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 in an effort to slow down the Iraqi nuclear program (a factor that might have actually worked to accelerate Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons).

Before the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. built a UN coalition against Iraq, which included Arab states, but excluded Israel, as it was feared that the involvement of the latter would undermine the coalition against Iraq. The risk today is that unilateral U.S.-UK attacks that are intended both to destroy Iraqi infrastructure and "double contain" Israel, could result in enflaming Arab opinion. (Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey have stated that they were not informed of the air strikes). This would particularly be true if the Palestinian crisis cannot be resolved. There is consequently a real danger that Israel could still ultimately opt for military engagement, if it continues to see both Iraq and Syria as threats.

The United States may find it nearly impossible to build a new coalition of forces against Iraq as was the case during the Persian Gulf war unless it finds ways to gain the support of France, Russia, Turkey, if not China--which all criticized the U.S.-UK action. The new Bush Administration has promised to support the not entirely unified Iraqi National Committee (INC) in a renewed effort to overthrow the Iraqi regime, but administration officials are divided as to how far to support the INC. Secretary of State Colin Powell's trip to the Middle East was designed to gain Arab governmental support for a new "smart sanctions" regime that is intended to permit the return of UN monitors (under UN Security Council Resolution 1284) and attempt to ameliorate the conditions of the Iraqi people and deflect popular Arab criticism of U.S.-UN policy, which could work to destabilize Arab leaderships. A very big agenda.

Afghanistan
Both the U.S. and Russia appear to be tacitly, if not overtly, cooperating against the Sunni Taliban in Afghanistan, which presently controls about 95% of Afghanistan. Such an alliance, coupled with UN sanctions against Afghanistan, would be designed to suppress forces loyal to Saudi millionaire Osama Bin Laden whom Washington has accused of masterminding the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, as well as the 12 October 2000 suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen. These actions resulted in the decision to use "cruise missile diplomacy" against the suspected camps of Ben Laden in Afghanistan (not to overlook cruise missile strikes in the Sudan).

The continuing conflict in Afghanistan may provide an opportunity for NATO-Russian cooperation through the PFP (although there is some concern that NATO could be drawn into conflict that it was not intending). Assuming the three sides do not support rival factions, NATO-Russian cooperation could also lead to Chinese cooperation, as China could be drawn into collective actions to control Uighur separatist movements based in Afghanistan.

India
India's geopolitical and nuclear rivalry with Pakistan, coupled with continued clashes over Kashmir, has indicated that nuclear weapons do not necessarily serve as a deterrent against conventional war: States can continue their wars of attrition and perhaps play Cold War games of "brinksmanship." India's Agni missile project is, in part, in response to China's intermediate and long-range ballistic missile program. New Delhi, like China, appears to be expanding its triphibious outreach in the acquisition of a blue water navy; it also appears to be looking to closer ties with Vietnam and South Korea (and possibly Japan) in response to China's previously close ties with Pakistan and Iran. Beijing and New Delhi likewise appear to be competing for control of the Andamen sea on the west coast of Mynamar leading to the Strait of Malacca.

The Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin largely backed India's position on Kashmir; Vladimir Putin seems to be engaging Pakistan as well, but is sustaining Russian support with India. Moscow has likewise been attempting to nudge China to resolve its border conflicts with India. (These tensions had expressed themselves in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, which broke out in October the same time as the Cuban missile crisis. Not-so-ironically, both Washington and Moscow backed New Delhi at that time, but simultaneously disputing over Cuba!)

While strongly backing Pakistan during the Cold War, China has, at least tentatively, begun to backtrack on that support for Islamabad following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the victory of the radical Sunni Taliban (which has likewise been opposed by Iran). In effect, China fears a radicalization of the situation in which both India and Pakistan now threaten each other with nuclear weapons and continue to engage in border clashes over Kashmir. Further destabilization of the region could loosen China's grips over Xinjiang and Tibet. Hence, it is in China's interest to cooperate in the effort to find a political solution to these crises.

The mutual fear of secessionist movements has thus begun to bring Russia, China, and India together despite their geohistorical disputes (and although suspicions remain among them). Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan are of primary concern to China; India is primarily concerned with Kashmir and Sri Lanka (with militant Tamil movements seeking independence within the latter). Russia is concerned with Chechnya, Karelia, Komi, as well as Kaliningrad, among others. Russia, China, India all condemned the U.S.-led NATO military intervention against Serbia in the war "over" Kosovo as an action that violated the principle of territorial state "sovereignty." Russia, China, and India have all feared the possibility that the U.S. policy might directly or indirectly provide support to regional secessionist movements.

Ironically however, despite its actions "over" Kosovo, NATO presently appears to backing the new Serbian leadership of Kostunica in cracking down against pro-Albanian secessionist movements in southern Serbia, in what appears to be a strategy of "honest broker." Concurrently, NATO is also backing Macedonia in its moves against pan-Albanian secessionists.

Japan, China, and the two Koreas
As there has been no peace treaty signed between the three major antagonists, Russia and Japan, and China and Japan, World War II never officially ended in Asia. Recently, however, Russia and Japan appear to have moved close to a negotiated settlement on the basis of mutual geopolitical interests, but a number of factors could still block a closer rapprochement. This has occurred at the same time that Japan has reaffirmed its alliance commitment with Washington since 1996.

Japan has increasingly looked to Washington following Pyongyang's test firing of a long range Taepodong missile directly over northern Japan; Tokyo has accordingly enhanced defense spending and agreed to some form of ballistic missile defense cooperation with the United States. Japanese politicians in the Diet openly debated the constitutionality of unilateral pre-emptive strikes and the need for a counter-strike capability.

Japanese claims to the Kuril islands (what the Japanese call the Northern territories) that were seized by the Soviet Union prior to the dropping of the A-Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States have thus far been opposed by Moscow despite previous Japanese discussions with Khruschev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, as well as Putin. The latter met with Japanese Prime Minister Mori in September 2000 but talks were squelched in part because of the accidental sinking of the Russian Kursk nuclear submarine. Tokyo and Moscow intend to meet again in the spring 2001.

 In 1956, Moscow had promised the conditional return of the two southernmost strategically less crucial islands; yet it has been reluctant to give up all four. On the one hand, Moscow hopes to obtain greater trade and aid from Tokyo; on the other hand, it fears giving up access to deep Pacific water for its submarine fleet for fear that Washington could use these islands to track its submarine movements. Engaged in a brutal war in Chechnya, Moscow also does not want to set any precedent for giving up remaining Russian territory following the disaggregation of the Soviet Union.

Moscow has thus hoped that the two countries would finally sign an interim peace agreement and leave the Kurils temporarily under Russian jurisdiction for later discussions. Tokyo, however, has to a certain extent been pressured by domestic nationalist groups to regain the islands (although not all Japanese see a necessity to do so); at the same time, pressure to regain the Kurils represents a game of strategic leveraging. On the one hand, Japan is concerned with greater Russian military assistance to Beijing and of a more assertive China. On the other hand, Russia needs Japanese financial assistance to help develop Sakhalin island and the Russian Far East, while Japan needs Russian oil and gas to lessen its dependence upon the Middle East/Persian gulf.

Concurrently, U.S. efforts to incorporate Japan into a BMD system, combined with fears of a separate Japanese-Russian deal, could result in a break off of Russian-Japanese talks--if not played carefully. On the one hand, Tokyo is concerned BMD might alienate Russia; on the other, it has looked to Washington develop theater anti-missile defenses (TMD). Here, Japan appears to be tightening its alliance with the United States in opposition to potential ballistic missile threats from China and North Korea (despite China's efforts to mediate between the two Koreas), at the same time that Tokyo hopes to deflect Moscow from supporting Beijing too strongly.

In addition to a new relationship with Russia, Japan could possibly to link with India as a potential counterpoise to Beijing; yet as Tokyo has hoped to mediate nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan (as a reminder of its own fateful past), Indo-Japanese relations have been strained, thus far blocking closer Indo-Japanese ties (Japan does not want to totally alienate Beijing either). On the one hand, both India and Japan appear to be taking countermeasures in response to China's burgeoning political-economic and triphibious influence; on the other hand, Moscow appears to be trying to bring China and India into closer cooperation, although it would more likely prefer dealing with a wealthy Japan than China. At the same time, Washington has been reticent to encourage closer Russo-Japanese relations, much as it has feared too close a relationship between Germany and Russia.

The Two Koreas
 Despite (or because of) North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, events on the Korean peninsula have taken a positive turn, but the final results are not in. South Korea's irenic "sunshine" policy has opened the door to a rapprochement with North Korea. At the same time North Korean failure to eliminate its nuclear program, coupled with U.S. insistence on deploying BMD defenses, could halt steps to end the partition of the country, and perhaps to form a confederation (as opposed to unified Korean state along German lines). President Clinton's trip to North Korea was called off because of North Korean failure to suspend its missile program (at the same time that President-elect Bush was calling for a national missile defense system).
 Despite valid fears of the North, South Korea is not entirely convinced that the Bush administration's support for either TMD or BMD is in its best interests. Signs of dissent indicate that members of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party believe that either TMD or BMD could upset on going inter-Korean détente and raise military tensions, particularly due to China's apparently adamant opposition to any form of ballistic missile defense. (See discussion below). An additional fear is that a NMD would lead American troops to withdraw from South Korea. Other South Korean analysts argue that it is too early to tell, but Seoul will need to engage in careful negotiations with the Bush administration.

Asia and the Rise of China
On the positive side, cooperation against piracy, for example, could help to bring China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea into mutually cooperative relations. On the negative side, however, claims to the Spratly islands by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines, for example, have blocked greater cooperation as has China's refusal to give up its claims to Taiwan by force--if need be.

Not so ironically, following years of secret and overt American assistance to China (following the Kissinger-Nixon opening to China), the latter has begun to try to break out of its perceived U.S.-Russian "double containment." On the one hand, China has, in a geohistorical sense, felt contained by the "unequal treaties" signed with Russia since the late 18th century; on the other hand, it has also felt contained by continued post-1949 American support for Taiwan.

In the post-Cold war period, China has attempted to forge an increasingly close strategic partnership with Russia that could be defined as a "non-agression pact" if a new draft of a 30 year bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation is signed this year. Moscow has appeared to be providing China with significant military supports for profit at the same time that it seeks to deflect Chinese claims away from central and northeast Asia and toward the Asian littoral. Chinese threats to control Taiwan represent a challenge to sea lines of communication and oil routes to Japan from the Persian Gulf.

Chinese goals in regard to Taiwan appear to be:
(1) Prevent the Taiwanese independence movement from instigating new movements of secession within the People's Republic by demonstration effect;
(2) To eliminate Taiwan's export competition with the People's Republic
(3) To assert control over the Spratly islands and other off-shore oil reserves;
(4) To eliminate a potential strategic-military threat from the island and to be in a better position to defend China from potential rivals.

China has reserved the right to use force against Taiwan in case the latter attempts to seek independence. Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian stated that he was ready for peace talks with Beijing but would not concede Beijing's demand of the recognition of the "one-China" principle. Beijing has regarded U.S. support for Taiwan as a violation of the Second Shanghai Communique of 1981, which promised to reduce U.S. military sales to Taiwan. Moreover, as Beijing perceives Bush administration plans to deploy either BMD or TMD systems as aimed primarily at China, it has warned that it will increase its nuclear arsenal 10 times from 16-20 Inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to 200-250 ICBMs if the United States proceeds with ballistic missile defenses.

Policy prescriptions
What can prevent what appears to be an inevitable collision? Can an irenic global strategy (that provides a sufficient range of positive and negative sanctions) be pursued?

The Nixon Center has offered a number of what appears to be pragmatic advice for the new Bush administration--yet more far-reaching steps will need to be taken in the effort to sustain global peace.

The Nixon Center puts as its first priority to prevent Russia from becoming a "spoiler" and using its relations with states like China, India, Iran, and former Soviet allies such as Iraq and North Korea to disrupt American and European interests. At the same time, the Nixon Center argues that "too visible American concern over a Russian-Chinese entente might only further tempt the parties to exaggerate their leverage." The issue raised here, however, is that so-called pragmatic "balance of power" approach has failed to recognize that U.S. policy, since the Nixon-Kissinger administration itself, has generally tilted toward the People's Republic of China. More theoretically, traditional "balance or power" politics leads nowhere. It does not provide an adequate long-term vision in contemporary circumstances and only perpetuates tensions that could lead, in the not too distant future, to major power conflict.

A more positive alternative would be to first forge a U.S.-EU-Russian-Japanese entente based upon a mutual or concerted accord. Such an entente would mean, in general, a NATO-EU-Russian accord over the Baltic states and Central Europe in which Russia is brought into a new form of NATO and EU membership. Second, Russia and Japan would seek out an entente over the Kuril islands-Northern territories backed by confidence building-measures, but at the same time, reducing Russian military support for China and other regional powers.

Such an entente would not be designed not to "contain" a rising China, but to seek a new "confederal" solution (that does not permit the People's Liberation Army onto Taiwan) to the PRC-Taiwan dispute based upon the principle "one nation, two states, several systems." Such an option could then assure China's appropriate place in the new global equilibrium, At the same time, a concerted irenic diplomacy aimed at preventing future crises and resolving regional political disputes (in regard to Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the South Korea's "sunshine policy" in regard to North Korea, for example) would be implemented in order to reduce regional tensions.

American strategy, whether overtly or inadvertently, has alienated Russia more deeply than the Nixon Center's term "spoiler" indicates. American geopolitical and economic policy in regard to Russia, as well as the present strategy of NATO enlargement in regard to Russia, has generally been regarded as near total failure; the United States and EU have yet to show Russia the positive benefits of joining the Euro-Atlantic community, and the downside of supporting China militarily in its quest to reunify with Taiwan. Increasingly, the choice for Russia is either that of a more thorough integration into a larger Euro-Atlantic Community or else a radical rejection of that possibility and a turn toward Eurasianism and revanche. Failure to begin a concerted process of NATO-EU engagement with Russia threatens to create a monster in Eurasia whose actions may prove entirely unpredictable and "irrational" from commonsense expectations, and which may seek to use threats, and the actual use of force, to obtain its goals.

Thus, instead of creating a knee jerk anti-Russian backlash that could possibly lead to NATO making a counter deployment in the region (as the Nixon Center report tacitly suggests ), the question of purported nuclear weapons deployment in Kaliningrad should serve to stimulate new debate and reexamination as to where NATO and EU and Russian relations are heading, A re-assessment of these relations should hopefully result in new proactive diplomatic actions intended to prevent an imminent crisis.

The Nixon Center does suggest that an interim step to secure Baltic states independence could be considered: "a declaration of NATO's stake in Baltic independence, on the model of NATO's Charter with Ukraine--short of an Article V commitment, but a security guarantee nonetheless." Yet, as proposed in my previous article in Geostrategiques , however, NATO, the EU, and Russia should take more far reaching steps toward the establishment of a Central and Eastern European Security and Defense Community backed by overlapping NATO, EU and Russian security guarantees. Rather than NATO alone guaranteeing Baltic state security and independence, all three powers can equally support that independence, likewise guaranteed by the deployment of multi-national Euro-Atlantic PfP forces. Setting up a NATO-EU-Russian headquarters for PfP operations in Kaliningrad would ease Russia's transition into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Only once Russia feels secure in its relations with the new Europe, can it then focus on development and refurbishing its economy, and work toward entry into the World Trade Organization, the OECD, and the EU (or at least associate membership in the latter). Although the modalities are far from being worked out (and American and Russian proposals are still far apart), NATO, the EU and Russia could participate in the security sphere in the joint development of theatre ballistic missile defenses for the Euro-Atlantic region. Bringing Russia into a closer relationship with NATO and the EU in new forms of membership in regard to equal power sharing should work to forge a more concerted relationship in regard to central and eastern Europe, but also the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East.

China could find it in its own interests to cooperate in regard to the Taliban in Afghanistan, but as long as it sustains its claims to take Taiwan by force, it will remain a threat to regional, if not world, peace. Here, the formation of a NATO-EU-Russian-Japanese entente can bring concerted diplomatic pressure on China; otherwise China can easily play Russian, Japanese, and European interests against those of the United States. From this perspective, rather than playing balance of power politics of Russia versus China, it may well prove necessary to tilt more decisively in the direction of Russia. China may fear a NATO-EU-Russian combination, but there is no need to alienate the Beijing if concerted pressures can bring China to accept a new confederal "one nation, two states and several systems" formula for the Taiwan question.

In regard to Ballistic Missile Defenses, it is important that the latter do not interfere with complex negotiations taking place in a number of countries affected by the missile issue, as pointed out. Will BMD prove to be a bargaining chip? Or will domestic American lobbies push it through despite its high costs and dubious effectiveness? Will BMD serve to artificially block the potential for negotiated settlements between Russia, China, Europe and the United States? Or will the EU, Russia, and the United States be able to accept a compromise proposal involving limited theatre boost phase systems?

Assuming it does move toward compromise, the Bush administration may gradually need to lower its expectations of achieving a fully national BMD and admit that there are many potential flaws in such a system, that the costs may be prohibitive, and that there are many ways to counter-act such a system (as Stealth technology can already be countered). This approach would mean developing a lesser tactical or theatre system that does not necessarily violate the ABM treaty or else permits a revision in the ABM treaty with Russian approval.

Concerted U.S.-EU-Russian diplomacy would then seek to engage the so-called "states of concern" by means of irenic diplomacy. Moreover, efforts by European allies such as Germany to mediate between Russia and the United States, particularly over the issue of BMD, should be supported by the Bush Administration, as should European efforts achieve a relatively more autonomous common foreign and security policy. The latter can only work to strengthen NATO in the sense of providing it with a new direction, and with more European responsibility sharing in exchange for burden sharing, but only assuming that NATO and the EU can work together to forge a concerted relationship with Russia as proposed. The concern raised here is that American decisions to opt for "selective intervention" risk a general trend toward unilateral intervention and militarization, as other regional powers may follow a unilateral path, if a concerted policy cannot be implemented.

The critical question remains: Can irenic geostrategy succeed? Is mutual compromise possible? The answer lies to a large extent in how open each of the respective sides are to mutual compromise. In this perspective, China is probably more intractable than Russia. As a rising power, China believes it can play U.S., EU, Japanese, and Russian interests against each other. Russia, on the other hand, knows it needs U.S. and European and Japanese assistance if it is ever to get back on its feet as a modicum of a significant power. Russia is primarily concerned with getting back on its feet and reaching a point of internal, and then external, stability; China, on the other hand, seeks to challenge the status quo.

The issue raised here is that only a concerted U.S.-EU-Russian-Japanese relationship can help secure and stabilize Russia and then bring it into a new Euro-Atlantic community and concurrently draw it away from military support for China. Only such a new concerted U.S., EU, Japanese, and Russian relationship can likewise pressure China sufficiently to permit it to reconsider its regional ambitions and to ultimately forge a new confederal relationship with Taiwan that will not provoke a conflagration in Asia. Here, it seems absolutely crucial to break apparently burgeoning Sino-Russian ties; Washington played the "China card" against Moscow during the Cold War, but now it appears that Russia is playing it back against United States.

 The new Bush administration thus has its hands full with potential emerging international crises. Let us hope it can, without too many internal administrative schisms, provide the necessary "vision thing" to deal effectively with the entire range of these crises--and before it proves too late.</sup>